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CHINA'S WAR ON GRAFT: POLITICO-LEGAL
CAMPAIGNS AGAINST CORRUPTION IN CHINA AND
THEIR SIMILARITIES TO THE LEGAL REACTIONS
TO CRISIS IN THE U.S.
Benjamin- van Rcoijl
Abstract: In the last two decades, China organized political campaigns to
fight corruption. Such campaigns led to an increased prosecution of high-profile
cases involving high-level officials. Perceived corruption in China, however, has not
decreased as a result, because the campaigns failed to address widespread lower-level
incidents. China's political campaigns against corruption-the politico-legal
campaigns-are an example of the use of political methods to enhance the legal
system. China has organized several politico-legal campaigns to promote public
awareness of legal issues and combat crimes, including illegal drug trade, copyright
infringements, and environmental violations. The Chinese politico-legal campaigns
show that China needs its effective laws to support government policies. A
comparative analysis shows that there is a similar need for effective laws in the
United States, especially in times of crises. Such effective laws usually come at the
cost of sacrificing the formal-rational legal limits on governmental actions. Now that
China is trying to establish the rule of law and the U.S. still faces crises related to
drugs, crime, and terrorism, both countries face similar challenges in balancing their
effective laws with the rule of law principle, and may learn from each other's
experience.
I. INTRODUCTION
A man explains how he stole a rubber eraser when he was ten years
old: "It was white and soft with the smell of an apple." As the camera
zooms out, we now see a man sitting on a bench with a sign indicating
that he is the accused. He goes on to explain how ashamed he felt when
his father discovered the theft and punished him with a yard-stick. The
camera zooms out to wide-angle and we now see the man sitting in court
while judges are listening to his testimony. He explains that he is charged
with accepting two million RMB, equivalent to approximately two
hundred thousand U.S. dollars, in bribes. "Two million," he sighs, "such
a huge amount.., that is what I took with my own hands. Never once
did I think it was something extraordinary or something I shouldn't do. It
gave me nothing near the excitement and stress of stealing the eraser
when I was ten." The man continues to explain that, as the former head
of the municipal finance department, he has nothing to add except that he
cannot believe how he could have changed so much from the ten-year-old
kid who was greatly embarrassed for stealing an eraser. He confesses: "If
* The author is a lecturer at the Van Vollenhoven Institute for Law Governance and
Development, Leiden University of the Netherlands. The present researcl, was made possible by a
generous grant from the Dutch Ministry of Education.
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the two million was an eraser, then I can admit to you that I stole it." The
scene ends with his wife bursting into the courtroom as the man is
sentenced to death for corruption-related crimes.'
This was the first scene of China's popular television drama Da
Faguan (Big Judge). This drama, co-produced by the Supreme People's
Court, served as a tool for propagating the rule of law in China. It is no
coincidence that the first issue the series dealt with was corruption.
Corruption has not only threatened the development of the legal system, it
has posed a challenge to the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party
("CCP"). Since 1979, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang
Zemin, the pillars of legitimacy were economic development and social
stability, which were closely connected to the fight against corruption.
With the recent power transition from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao on
September 19, 2004, the new leader seems even more determined than his
predecessors to emphasize the corruption problem. As an editorial in the
New York Times put it: "Broadly speaking, Mr. Hu is seen as embracing
the idea that China needs to focus more on populist social problems, like
corruption, health care, income inequality and environmental pollution,
while Mr. Jiang has often spoken about the importance of maintaining a
high rate of economic growth as the first priority.",
2
Over the years, the message has been clear: those who take bribes
will be punished and may even lose their lives. It is the same message
that Chinese media conveys regularly when it reports on the progression
of the ongoing anti-corruption campaigns. In these campaigns, officials
found guilty of corruption-related crimes receive harsh sentences. Harsh
punishment and, in some cases, execution of well known or high-ranking
officials and businessmen are handed down in an attempt to cure the
country's corruption problem. This Article looks at these anti-corruption
campaigns as one of the methods used in China to fight corruption.
This Article begins in Part H with an introduction to the concept of
corruption, especially as it is used in China. Part III introduces the
campaigns against corruption and analyzes their trends in relation to
national policies. Then in Part IV, the Article compares such campaigns
with other politico-legal campaigns in China to shed some light on the
roles political pressure and legitimacy play in the development of law.
Finally, Part V reviews several cases in which law has been used as a
political tool to deal with national crises in the U.S. They will help us
Based on Episode One of Da Faguan, a dramatized television show broadcast by Chinese
Central TV in 1999. For a later book based on this television show, see HONGSEN ZHANG, DA FAGUAN
[BIG JUDGE] 1-4 (2000).
2 Joseph Kahn, China's 2 Top Leaders Square Offin Contest to Run Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2,
2004, at A3.
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understand the influence of politics on law and the relationship between
the rule of law and the need for effective law.
II. CORRUPTION IN CHINA: DEFINITIONS, TRENDS AND CAUSES
Since the reform period, the saying "to get rich is glorious" has
come to replace Mao's communist utopia for many Chinese.3 The dark
4side of China's rush for gold has been the rampant corruption. As one
Chinese writer commented cynically, "[t]he religion of the Chinese today
is cheating, deceit, blackmail, and theft ... We think any honest, humble
gentleman as a fool and regard any good person who works hard and
demands little in return an idiot." 5  One analyst described China's
corruption using an analogy of Mao's comment that "revolution is not a
dinner party.",6 He writes that "for the rich and corrupt officials, the
reform has literally been a 'dinner party.' 7 A survey reveals that in 1992
alone about US $18 billion of public funds was spent on dinner parties. 8
One could ask whether spending public money on dinner parties is
corruption. Any discussion of corruption will generate this kind of
question. It is therefore important to take a closer look at how corruption
is defined. Chinese official terminology essentially defines corruption as
"the use of public authority and public resources for private interests.
9
This is very broad and can be read to include all sorts of activities. In
China's 1997 Criminal Code we find further detail on the types of
corruption. First there is the general definition of graft which the code
defines as "State personnel who take advantage of their office to
misappropriate, steal, swindle or use other illegal means to acquire state
properties."' 0 The Code then further details several types of graft; first is
embezzlement (tanwu). Embezzlement occurs when "State personnel
take advantage of their office and misappropriate public funds for
personal use or illegal activities or misappropriate large amounts of
3 Cheng Li, Revolution Is No Dinner Party But China's Reform Is, Officials Grow Rich at
Public Expense, CNN.cOM, at http://edition.cnn.com/specials1999/china.50/red.giantlcommunism
(last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
4 Zengke He, Corruption and Anti-corruption in Reform China, 33 COMMUNIST AND POST-
COMMUNIST STUDIES 243 (2000).
5 GEREMIE R. BARMt, IN THE RED: ON CONTEMPORARY CHINESE CULTURE 265-66 (1999)
(quoting Xin He, Gudu yu Tiaozhan-wodefendou yu sikao [Loneliness and Challenge-My Struggle
and Reflection], 10 ZIXUE ZAZHI (1988)).
6 Li, supra note 3.
7 id.
8 Id.
9 He, supra note 4, at 244.
10 ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XINGFA HUIBIAN [CRIMINAL CODE OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA] art. 382 (1997) [hereinafter CHINESE CRIMINAL CODE]. An English translation of
China's 1997 Criminal Code is available at http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/prclaw60.htm#Chapter%
20VIII2 (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
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public funds without returning the money within three months."'"1 The
second is accepting bribes (shouhui), which occurs when "State personnel
take advantage of their office to demand money or things from other
people or if they illegally accept money or things from other people in
return of favors."' 12 Accepting bribes also includes activities where "State
personnel in their economic operation accept various kinds of kickback
and handling fees for their personal use in violation of state provisions."'
' 3
Finally, the Criminal Code provides that the crime of offering bribes
(huilu) occurs when a person "gives state functionaries articles of
property in order to seek illegitimate gains.'
' 4
China's definition of corruption as misuse of public authority for
private interests is very similar to the definition used by Transparency
International, the global corruption watchdog. This organization has been
monitoring corruption worldwide using its Corruption Perceptions Index
("CPI"). This index is based on surveys carried out by a number of
independent institutions throughout the world. The CPI ranks countries
"in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among
public officials and politicians."' 15 The CPI defines corruption as "the
abuse of public office for private gain."' 16 This Article uses the Chinese
and the CPI definitions for corruption as working definitions.
Because the definition used in the CPI is very similar to the one
used by the Chinese government, the CPI is especially useful in analyzing
corruption in China. Table 1 contains the CPI data on China for
approximately the last twenty years. 17 In the CPI index, the lower the
score, the higher the amount of perceived corruption.
Id. art. 384.
12 Id. art. 385.
I' Id. art. 385(2).
14 Id. art. 389.
15 TRANSPARENCY INT'L, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: TI CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX
(CPI 2004), available at http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2004/cpi2004_faq.en.html (last visited Apr.
17, 2005).
16 Johann Graf Lambsdorff, 2002 Corruption Perceptions Index, in TRANSPARENCY INT'L,
GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2003 at 262 (2003), available at http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/
gcr2003.html#download (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
17 He, supra note 4, at 246; Lambsdorff, supra note 16, at 264-65; TRANSPARENCY INT'L,
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2003, available at
http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2003/cpi2003.en.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2005); TRANSPARENCY
INT'L, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2002, available at
http://www.transparency.org/pressreleases-archive/2002/2002.08.28.cpi.en.htm (last visited Apr. 17.
2005); TRANSPARENCY INT'L, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2001,
available at http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2001/cpi200l.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2005);
TRANSPARENCY INT'L, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2000,
available at http://www.transparency.org/cpi/20O0/cpi2000.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2005);
TRANSPARENCY INT'L, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 1999,
available at http://www.transparency.org/cpi/1999/cpi1999.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
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Table 1: Corruption Perception Index of China 1980-200318
1980-1985 1988-1992 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Score 5.13 4.73 2.16 2.43 2.88 3.5 3.4 3.1 3.5 3.5 3.4
Rank n.a. n.a. 40 50 41 52 58 63 57 59 66
Survey No. 1 3 4 9 6 10 11 11 10 11 13
Total Countries n.a. n.a. 41 54 51 85 99 90 91 102 133
Table 1 illustrates the historical development of China's CPI scores.
These scores illustrate a slight increase in perceived corruption after 1985
and especially since 1992. Then from 1995 to 1998, there is a slight
decline in corruption followed by a relatively stable period between 1998
and 2003 with relatively little fluctuation in perceived corruption.
These data are in line with other findings on China's corruption.
Most inquiries into this issue show that corruption has spread since the
reform period. 19 Some authors try to determine the origin of this
development. 20 Their findings indicate a linkage between corruption and
the development of market economy. 21 Examples show that this created a
dual price mechanism that differentiated the high market prices of the
private sector from the low prices of the public sector.22 Other examples
indicate that China's market reform led to an influx of foreign investment
23
which created graft opportunities. The second cause of corruption that
has been identified is the relatively slow increase in public officials'
incomes as compared to those of managers in state-owned or private
enterprises.24 The third cause is the weak regulatory system that allowed
corruption to grow. 25 Part of the problem within the regulatory system
was the factional conflict at the top and the increase of local autonomy
throughout the regulatory system. 2F The fourth cause is the incomplete
political reform that resulted in a lack of checks and balances, lack of
independence of anti-corruption agencies, and lack of societal actions
27
against corruption. This is partially related to the rapid increase of
administrative expenditure-around 474% between 1980 and 1990. As
officials gained more discretion and controlled more resources, they were
18 id.
'9 Of course pre-reform China also knew corruption. For a good analysis of this subject, see
XIAOBo L0, CADRES AND CORRUPTION, THE ORGANIZATIONAL INVOLUTION OF THE CHINESE
COMMUNIST PARTY (2000).
20 He, supra note 4, at 243-270; LO, supra note 18, at 154-257; Kin-man Chan, Corruption in
China: A Principle-Agent Perspective, in HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATION IN THE ASIA-
PACIFIC BASIN 299-324 (Hoi-kwok Wong & Hon S. Chan eds., 1999).
21 He, supra note 4, at 248-51; LO, supra note 18, at 190; Chan, supra note 19, at 308.
22 He, supra note 4, at 248-51; Chan, supra note 19, at 310.
23 Chan, supra note 19, at 308.
24 He, supra note 4, at 251.
2'Id. at 251-53.
26 Chan, supra note 19, at 311-14.
27 LO, supra note 18, at 156-57; He, supra note 4, at 253-54.
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28
exposed to an increasing number of corruptive opportunities. The fifth
cause is a lack of ethics against corruption due to the changes in ideology
(from class struggle to economic development), the failure to ethically
educate the officials, and the lack of "commercial morality in economic
life.",29 This means that old ethics linked to communist ideology have
become obsolete, while new market-related ethics have yet to develop in
society.30 Finally, some authors have linked post-Mao corruption to the
Chinese culture: a tradition of absolutist personal rule on the one hand,
and the importance of personal networks, reciprocity, and gift giving on
the other. 3 Lu emphasizes that corruption in China is unique because it
is more organized and less individual. He writes:
Rent-seeking and graft exist in many societies. What
characterizes such activities in contemporary China under
reform is the widespread rent-seeking activities by
government agencies and public units. It is not uncommon
for a policeman in the United States to be found guilty of
extortion or of accepting bribes. What is rare is for police
departments to run their own businesses (some of which
involve prostitution and drugs) and to extort payments as a
unit. Corruption in the post-Mao reform has become more
pervasive, as evidenced in the fact that official corruption
takes place both at the individual level and the
organizational level-that is, illicit actions are taken not by
single individuals or by collusion among individuals, but by
a public agency to achieve material gains for the agency as a
whole through the use of its power.3 2
Scholars and writers outside of China have also studied the cause
of corruption, mostly in order to find out ways to fight against it. The
most famous study on the causes and methods of fighting corruption was
done by Klitgaard based on the experiences of an anti-corruption program
in the Philippines.33 Klitgaard developed a "stylized" formula to describe
some of the main causes of corruption and to help find solutions:
Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion - Accountability
34
28 Chan, supra note 19, at 309.
29 LO, supra note 18, at 162-64; He, supra note 4, at 254-55.
30 L0, supra note 18, at 162-64; He, supra note 4, at 254-55.
31 Lu, supra note 18, at 175-88; He, supra note 4, at 255-56.
32 LO, supra note 18, at 201.
33 ROBERT KLrTGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION (1988).
34 Id. at 75.
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This formula implies that corruption results from excessive
monopoly and discretion and too little accountability in the public
sector.35 In order to fight corruption, therefore, the accountability needs
to be enhanced while monopoly and discretion are reduced. The
formula can be used to design anti-corruption strategies.37  Fighting
corruption entails structural reforms of the public service, which will lead
to less monopoly and discretion, and more accountability. It also means
that the fight against corruption needs law enforcement to improve its
accountability and subject its discretionary powers not just to formal
rules-by, for example, clarifying the relevant laws-but also to actual
limitations by implementing such laws within the administrative
structure. 38 A United Nations Development Programme report
summarizing the experiences of global efforts against corruption found
that anti-corruption strategies combine three components: "enforcement
of law, prevention through institutional reforms, and mobilisation of the
population." 39 States may implement such strategies in a variety of ways
including structural changes. 0 Changing the public service system (to
allow for job rotation, higher salaries, and evaluations), initiating reforms
that will allow the public to participate in the decision-making process,
legalizing the freedom of the press, setting up independent anti-corruption
institutions, and training the public servants are some of the examples of
anti-corruption measures.4' States also employ curative measures mainly
in the form of anti-corruption campaigns as part of their efforts to fight
against corruption. 42 In China, this last method-fighting against
corruption through anti-corruption campaigns-has been an important
aspect of the anti-corruption strategy.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 ROBERT KLITGAARD ET AL., CORRUPT CITIES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO CURE AND PREVENTION
26-28 (2000).
38 This is "real discretion" based on Davis's definition of a public official's discretion as a
situation in which "the effective limits on his power leave him free to make a choice among possible
courses of action or inaction." K.C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY ENQUIRY 4
(1969).
39 Sahr K. Kpundeh & Irene Hors, Overview, in CORRUPTION & INTEGRITY IMPROVEMENT
INITIATIVES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES I 1-12 (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) &
OECD Development Centre eds., 1998).
40 id,
41 Id.
42 Daniel Kaufmann, Revisiting Anti-Corruption Strategies: Tilt Towards Incentive-Driven
Approaches?, in CORRUPTION & INTEGRITY IMPROVEMENT INITIATIVES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES,
supra note 38, at 63-64.
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III. CHINESE ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGNS REVEAL THE STRATEGY OF
PROSECUTING HIGH-PROFILE CASES WHILE NEGLECTING MINOR
ONES
The Chinese media's rapidly growing coverage on corruption since
the 1990s shows a trend of stricter sentences as well as an increase in the
level of the officials prosecuted through the campaigns. Data provided by
the Supreme People's Procurate in their annual report to the National
People's Congress ("NPC") indicate, however, that the total number of
prosecuted cases has fluctuated, even though prosecution of major cases
has continuously increased during the same period. These trends reveal
that there has been a political choice to direct both media attention and
anti-corruption efforts toward highly visible major cases, while
decreasing efforts against widespread corruptive practices on the lower
levels. Consequently, the perceived level of corruption did not decrease.
A. Two Hands: Corruption Campaigns in the 1980s Were the First
Start in the Fight Against Graft
In the 1980s, the central leadership of China understood the
growing urgency of the corruption problem and initiated a program
against it. In 1982, Deng said: "We have two hands, one to uphold our
policy of opening up to the outside and stimulating the economy, and the
other to uphold our crackdown on economic crimes. 4 3 Subsequently, in
March 1982, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
("SCNPC") launched a campaign to impose severe punishments
(yanzheng) on serious economic crimes. In 1988, the SCNPC issued a
special statute on corruption-related crimes and for the first time 44 in the
1980s, the words "corruption" and "bribery" were used in the campaigns
instead of the catch-all concept "economic crimes" that is more neutral
and less politically sensitive. 5 The new SCNPC statute46 provided the
43 Supreme People's Court, Zuigao Renminfayuan he Zuigao Jianchayuan Fezeren Jiu Fabu
Guanyu Tanwu Shouhui Toujidaoba deng Fanzuifenzi Bixu zai Xianqinei Zishou Tanbaide Tonggao
Da Xinghuashe Jiazhe Wen [Responsible Persons of the Supreme People's Court and Procurate
Answer Questions to Xinhua News Agency on the Issuing of the Notice that Criminals Who Engage in
Crimes Such as Corruption, Accepting Bribes and Speculation and Profiteering Must Voluntarily
Surrender and Confess Within a Limited Time], 19 GAZETTE OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT 5
(1989).
44 In the 1950s, there were several anti-corruption campaigns. See Ye Feng, The Chinese
Procurates and the Anti-Corruption Campaigns in the People's Republic of China, in
IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 113-17 (2002).
45 See Supplementary Regulations on Suppression of Corruption and Bribery, Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress (Jan. 21, 1988) [hereinafter Supplementary Regulations].
The present Criminal Code, which was revised in 1997, has two sections related to corruption:
Chapters VIII and IX of Part Two of the Code. Arts. 382-396 concern crimes of embezzlement and
bribery, while arts. 397-419 concern crimes of dereliction of duty. CHINESE CRIMINAL CODE, supra
note 10.
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definitions of corruption-related crimes and the scope of relevant
punishments. It specified the general regulations on corruption laid down
in the old criminal code by defining the specific types of corruption and
prescribing punishments for each type. In 1989, the Supreme People's
Court ("SPC") and the Supreme People's Procurate ("SPP") initiated
their first campaign against corruption, which set a time limit of two and
a half months for individuals guilty of corruption to come clean and
confess. Those who did so would get lighter punishments for their
crimes.47 During this short campaign, courts, procurates, police, and
supervisory departments cooperated with each other and coordinated their
activities. They organized internal study sessions to enhance their
awareness of corruption issues and cooperated closely with local party
leaders in order to strengthen the campaign. Efforts were made to
involve the public through the use of public media and propaganda.
Courts published model decisions through the media. Courtrooms
became open to the public.
48
This campaign was the result of the Fourth Plenum of the
Thirteenth Chinese Communist Party ("CCP") Congress, which was
mainly dedicated to the Tiananmen Student Protests. Chinese leadership
realized that corruption was one of the main issues that sparked the
protests and that needed to be resolved. The Congress made the fight
against corruption "an important task., 49 Jiang Zemin, the head of State
at that time, declared:
Our fight against economic crime and corruption is not only
a rigorous economic fight, it is also a political struggle
involving the life and death of our country s° ... This is a
long, hard and difficult struggle ... We should make full use
of the people's courts and make those courts pay close
attention to their long-term task of cracking down on
economic crimes.5'
46 Supplementary Regulations, supra note 44.
47 Supreme People's Court, Zuigao Renminfayuan Zuigao Jianchayuan Guanyu Tanwu Shouhui
Toujidaoba deng Fanzuifenzi Bixu zai Xianqinei Zishou Tanbaide Tonggao [Supreme People's Court
and Supreme People's Procurate Notice That Criminals Who Engage in Crimes Such as Corruption,
Accepting Bribes and Speculation and Profiteering Must Voluntarily Surrender and Confess Within a
Limited Time], 19 GAZETrE OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT 3 (1989).
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Jiang repeated this phrase in a later speech in 1997 in which he said that if corruption could
not be tackled the party would lose the trust and support of the masses. See ZEMIN JIANG, LUN YOU
ZHONGGUO TESE SHEHUI ZHUYI [ON SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS] 428 (2002).
51 Jianxin Ren, Guanyu renminfayuan Guanche Zhixing Liangyuan "Tonggao" de Qingkuang
Baogao [Report on the People's Courts Implementation of the SPC and PPC " Notice"], 20 GAzETrE
OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT 8 (1989).
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In total, the campaign dealt with 5167 cases and punished 7913
people. In order to show the people the seriousness of this campaign, it
focused on large cases involving more than 10,000 RMB. Courts and
procurates paid special attention to building factually sound cases and
producing sufficient evidence of the crimes. At the end of this campaign,
the SPC and the SPP produced a report of the progress they had made and
the lessons they learned from it.52 Even though results were said to be
good, the success of the campaign was not uniform throughout the
nation-the report stated that some localities made far less efforts than
others in fighting against corruption.
B. Executing Figureheads: Campaigns in the 1990s and the New
Millennium Focused on High-Profile Cases
In 1995, Jiang Zemin initiated a new anti-corruption drive urging
people to fight corruption. This served as a boost to the fight against
corruption. A crackdown on corruption in the Jilin Province illustrates
this point at the provincial level.53 In one year, the provincial authorities
handled a total of 1018 major cases of bribery involving over ten
thousand RMB and of embezzlement of over fifty thousand RMB.
Fifteen of the cases involved amounts over one million RMB. According
to the Report, the public participated by providing complaints and reports
on corruption incidents that led to a total of 13,994 investigations. The
focus of the crackdown, however, was on the major cases. A comparison
with the earlier campaigns demonstrates that, even at the provincial level,
the amount required for a corruption case to qualify as a major one made
a giant leap-from ten thousand to one million RMB.
Around the time of the Fifteenth Party Congress in 1997, anti-
corruption fighting shifted to the next gear. By that time the levels of
involved officials, the amounts of bribes, and the sentence periods
imposed upon those guilty of corruption crimes had increased
dramatically. In September 1997, the former mayor and party secretary
of Beijing, Chen Xitong, who was also a Politburo member, became the
subject of investigations on corruption-related charges. An internal party
investigation found that he had "accepted and embezzled a large number
of valuable items, and had squandered a large amount of public funds to
support a corrupt and decadent life.",54 His prosecution and later sentence
52 Id. at 8.
53 Annual Statistics from Jilin Provincial Procurate, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS:
ASIA PACIFIC, FE/2645 Sil/I (June 22, 1996) (referring to 'Excerpts' of Jilin Provincial People's
Procurate Work Report Given by Chief Procurator Li Xiangwu at the Fourth Session of the Eight
Provincial People's Congress on 4th February, JILIN RIBAO, Feb. 18, 1996).
54 The Corrupt Comrade, BBC NEWS, July 31, 1998, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk2/hi/
asia-pacific/143163.stm (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
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of sixteen years caused quite a shock. He was the highest ranking official
to be prosecuted in court since the Gang of Four in 1976.55 Even though
lower level officials had received death sentences in similar cases before,
many did not consider the death penalty an option because of Chen's
seniority. On the other hand, there were arguments for a heavy penalty to
appease the general public.56
Chen Xitong's case was the first in a series of prosecutions brought
against high-ranking officials on corruption charges. Whereas Chen was
sentenced to just sixteen years in prison, those who followed him
received more severe treatment from the courts. In March 2000, the
former deputy governor of Jiangxi Province and former senior official of
the State Council, Hu Changqing, was executed on corruption-related
charges. He was said to have taken bribes of about US $660,000 and
received US $200,000 worth of propertyv in exchange for business
licenses and travel permits to Hong Kong. He was further accused of
bribing others to improve his career path.58 At the time, Hu was the
highest-ranking government official ever to be sentenced to death on
corruption-related charges59-a record soon to be broken. Around the
time of Hu Changqing's execution, corruption charges were brought
against another high level official: Cheng Kejie, vice chairman of the
NPC. 60  His corrupt activities came to light when an anti-corruption
investigation team investigating a case involving the deputy-mayor in
Guangxi Province received a telephone call by a senior Guangxi leader
requesting to call off further investigations. Instead of following this
request, the investigating team managed to get the Supreme People's
Procurate in Beijing to send its own team to the Province to continue the
investigation. Their work brought forward proof of how Guangxi
Province had become one of China's most corrupt provinces under Cheng
Kejie's leadership involving not only the former governor himself, but
many other senior officials.6' Cheng himself allegedly received US$ 41
million in bribes and illegal kickbacks.6 2
At the same time, China's Premier, Zhu Rongji, made an urgent
call to crack down on corruption while addressing the NPC. He said:
55 Chinese Court Dismisses Corruption Appeal, BBC NEWS, Aug. 20, 1998, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1 54608.stm (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
56 The Corrupt Comrade, supra note 53.
57 Duncan Hewitt, Top Chinese Official Executed, BBC NEWS, Mar. 8, 2000, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/669917.stm (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
58 Chinese Official Sentenced to Death, BBC NEWS, Feb. 15, 2000, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilasia-pacific/643607.stm (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
59 id.
60 Editorial, Warning Signal, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 1, 2000, available at LEXIS,
Nexis Library, ALLNWS file.
61 Mark O'Neil, How Cheng Built China's Most Corrupt Province, SOUTH CHINA MORNING
POST, Aug. 1, 2000.
62 Id.
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"We still fall far short of what the central authorities require of us and
what the people expect of us and [China] must take more effective
measures and make unremitting efforts to fight corruption and build a
clean and honest government.",6  Nearly half a year later, Cheng Kejie's
punishment was changed from a suspension to the death penalty. He was
executed shortly afterwards. 64 Xinhua News Agency reported:
The crimes he committed as a senior official seriously
damaged the normal working order of government
institutions, tarnished the clean and honest image of
government workers and discredited the fine reputation of
government officials, and thus should be harshly dealt with
by law.
65
The presiding judge at Cheng's trial was quoted in Xinhua as
saying, "the death penalty was justified because it served as a full
demonstration of the principle 'all are equal before the law,' as stated in
the Constitution., 66 Cheng Kejie's mistress, who conspired in her lover's
corrupted activities, received a life sentence. She escaped the death
penalty by helping the prosecution against Cheng Kejie and helping the
state to recover public funds.67
In 2000, another big case involving high level leadership shocked
the country. In Xiamen, a port city in China, the Yuanhua trade group,
led by Lai Chengxing, allegedly smuggled goods with a total value of US
$6.83 billion, evading US $3.6 billion in taxes between 1996 and 1999.
They were able to do so by bribing a large number of officials of key
departments, including the customs and the port office. Several high
level officials were implicated, the highest of whom was Li Jizhou, the
former Vice-Minister of Public Security.68 The People's Daily wrote:
"Li ... had a daughter in the United States. Lai immediately mailed US
$500,000 to Li's daughter and offered one million RMB to Li's wife
when he learned her plans to start a business." 69 The first round of trials
started in September 2000. At least two hundred suspects were brought
63 Chinese Premier Urges Crackdown on Corruption: Deputy Governor To Be Executed,
CNN.cOM, Mar. 5, 2000, available at http://edition.cnn.conV20OO/ASIANOW/east/03/04/china.politics.
03 (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
64 Yan Meng, Prosecutors "To Step Up Corruption Fight," CHINA DAILY, Mar. 12, 2003,
available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cnlen/doc/2003-03/12/content-157606.htm (last visited Apr.
17, 2005).
65 O'Neil, supra note 60.
66 id.
67 Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan & Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Mistress of Disgraced Top Cadre Gets Life, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 10, 2000, at 8.
68 Details of Xiamen Smuggling Case Exposed, PEOPLE'S DAILY, July 26, 2001, available at
http://english.people.com.cn/english/200107/25/eng20010725 7 57 8 0.htffl (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
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before judges in five cities in Fujian. By November, the courts sentenced
fourteen officials to death for accepting bribes. The officials sentenced to
death included high-level cadres such as Xiamen customs chief Yang
Qianxian, Xiamen deputy mayor Lan Fu, and deputy police chief of
Southern Fujian Province, Zhuang Rushun. 70 In December 2000, a
second round of trials brought almost a hundred new suspects before the
judges of five Fujian courts. On October 22, 2001, Li Jizhou, former
Deputy Minister of Public Security, received a death sentence with a two
year suspension by a Beijing court.7 '
While the courts and the prosecutors actively pushed for rigid
punishments for high-level officials, state authorities outside the judiciary
system made use of popular media and mass mobilization techniques to
strengthen the campaign's effectiveness. In August 2000, Chinese
officials at all levels were ordered to go to the cinema to see "Life and
Death Choice." This was a new movie "depicting the battle of an honest
mayor against corruption in the Communist party including his own wife
and one of his best friends." According to reports, viewers in Beijing
72spontaneously applauded during a preview screening. Another example
of the mass mobilization efforts were corruption exhibitions. In August
21, 2000, for example, just after Cheng Kejie was sentenced to death and
while he was still appealing his sentence, the Beijing Military Museum
organized an exhibition called "Beijing City Strikes Hard and Guards
Against Economic Crimes." During this exhibition, the museum showed
corruption-related materials such as seized evidence, video footage of
illegal activities, court proceedings, propaganda posters, and legal
documents. There was also a special display for Cheng Kejie's case.73 A
similar exhibition was organized in Xiamen in relation to its smuggling
case. 74 It was even reported that several travel agencies had been
organizing an "anti-corruption tour" to visit the Xiamen exhibition.75
70 China Sentences 14 Officials to Death in Graft Case, CNN.coM, Nov. 9, 2000, available at
http://edition.cnn.com20O/ASIANOW/east/l1l/08/china.corruptionlindex.html (last visited Apr. 17,
2005).
7 Former Deputy Public Security Minister Sentenced to Death, PEOPLE'S DAILY, Oct. 23, 2001,
available at http://english.people.com.cn/englishV200110/23/eng20011023-82949.html (last visited
Apr. 17, 2005). Suspension means that the execution of the death penalty will be delayed two years,
according to § 48 of the Chinese Criminal Code of 1997. See supra note 11.
72 Duncan Hewitt, Chinese Cinema Mobilised Against Corruption, BBC NEWS, Aug. 19, 2000,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/887210.stm (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
73 Hundreds Flock to Witness Crime Exhibition, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 21, 2000,
at 8.
74 Investigation into Biggest Smuggling Case Put on Display, PEOPLE'S DAILY, Aug. 28, 2001,
available at http://english.people.com.cn/english/200108/28/eng20010828-78545.html (last visited
Apr. 17, 2005).
75 Rose Tang, China Turns Corruption into Tourist Attraction, CNN.coM, Aug. 27, 2001,
available at http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/08/27/china.tourism (last visited Apr. 17,
2005).
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In July 2001, Jiang Zemin, when addressing the party to celebrate
its 80th anniversary, called for a stronger effort against corruption.
"Party organisations and leading cadres at all levels must take a stand to
oppose corruption," he said.76 In March 2001, China's top legislator, Li
Peng, followed suit when he also vowed to step up the fight against
corruption months after the execution of the NPC's vice-chairman Cheng
Kejie.77 According to China Daily, in 2001 alone, the people's procurates
throughout the country investigated more than 36,000 corruption cases
and recovered US $495 million worth of economic losses. There were
1319 cases involving more than one million RMB. Among the officials
detained, there were 2670 officials at the county or higher levels,
including six provincial or ministerial level officials.78
The high profile cases reported by the media in 2001 included: Li
Jizhou's involvement in the Xiamen smuggling; Wang Leyi, deputy
director of the General Customs Administration, who was prosecuted for
embezzlement and bribery; 79 Cong Fukui, former deputy-governor of
Hebei Province, who was also prosecuted for bribery and, in 2003,
sentenced to death with a two-year suspension; 80 Mu Suixin, Shenyang
city's former mayor, who was sentenced to death with a two year
suspension along with his deputy Ma Xiangdong; 8 1 Wang Huaizhong,
Anhui's deputy governor, who was prosecuted for graft-related crimes;
82
and finally, Jiang Yanping, a former vice director of the Hunan
Construction Engineering Co., who was sentenced to death for sexually
seducing officials to advance her career and receiving bribery for a total
amount of five million RMB. The verdict stated: "Not only was the
amount of money involved in the corruption extremely large, the methods
used were very cunning. 83 The decision further indicated: "Her crimes
are indeed serious and justify severe punishment according to law."' 4
76 Fong Tak-ho, Jiang Plan to Combat Corruption Questioned, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 2,
200 1, at 4.
77 Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan, Li Peng Vows to Step Up Graft War: Chairman Warns Failure to
Stamp Out Corruption Could Destroy Both Party and State, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 10, 2001,
at 7.
78 War on Corruption Continues, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 12, 2002, available at http://www.china.
org.cn/english/archiveen/28609.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
79 GAC Vice Director Charged on Graft, PEOPLE'S DAILY, Apr. 27, 2001, available at
http://english.people.com.cn/english/200104/27/eng20010427_68766.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
80 Week in Brief, SHANGHAI STAR, May 1, 2003, available at http://appl.chinadaily.com.cn/star/
2003/0501/bz I 1.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
81 Two Officials Sentenced to Death for Corruption Amid China's Resolve to Eliminate Fraud,
PEOPLE'S DAILY, Oct. 11, 2001, available at http://english.people.com.cn/english/2001 10/1 I/eng2001
101 1_81999.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
82 China Strengthens Anti-Corruption Campaign in 2001, PEOPLE'S DAILY, Dec. 31, 2001,
available at http://english.people.com.cn/200112/31/eng200l1231_87821.shtml (last visited Apr. 17,
2005).
83 Clara Li, Seductress to Die for Graft Crimes, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 25, 2001, at 7.
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While the anti-corruption campaign's prosecution of high-level
officials made newspaper headlines in 2001, Chinese leaders continued to
emphasize their commitment to the "anti-graft struggle." In 2002, the
press reported that the Supreme People's Procurate issued a notice calling
for a period of six months of concentrated effort on corruption-related
crimes, which would be directed specifically towards verifying the
decisions to prosecute cases. The prosecutors who had been lax in
carrying out their duties (related to corruption) or, even worse, had aided
corruption-related criminals were to receive criminal punishment. 85 In
October 2002, weeks before the Sixteenth CCP Party Congress, the CCP
"hailed the success of its ongoing anti-corruption campaign." It looked
back upon the last five years and claimed that it had purged 780,000
cadres and reclaimed thirty billion RMB of stolen public funds. 86 The
cadres were jailed, executed, or internally disciplined. Of the convicted
cadres, approximately ten thousand were from division levels, seven
hundred were departmental directors, and twenty-one were provincial or
ministerial heads. 87 In February 2003, Wu Guanzheng, chairman of the
CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and member of the
Politburo, urged members of his committee to work harder against
corruption. His call came a month after the Politburo had decided that
"officials at all levels should submit to public supervision." Mr. Wu is
quoted as telling his committee members: "We must adhere to the rule of
honesty and self-discipline," "harshly punish corrupt officials," and
"deepen anti-corruption work within organizations and enterprises."
88
High-level corruption cases have continued to appear on the
headlines ever since. For example, in 2002, Wang Xuebing, former head
of the Bank of China, was expelled from the CCP on charges of accepting
bribes and embezzlement. 89 Another prominent case involved Li Jiating,
former governor of Yunnan Province. In May 2003, the Second
Intermediate Court in Beijing sentenced him to death with a two-year
suspension for abusing his public office and taking bribes amounting to
over eighteen million RMB.90
85 Huanqing Wu, Zuigao Renmin Jianchayuan Fachu Tongzhi Yaoqiu Yenli Daji Jingji Fanzui
[The Supreme People's Procurate Issues a Decree on Striking Hard Against Economic Crimes],
XINHUA NET, Mar. 5, 2002.
86 Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan, Crackdown on Corrupt Cadres Hailed as Big Success, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Oct. 15, 2002, at 11.
87 id.
88 Chinese Official Vows to End Corruption, BBC NEWS, Feb. 18, 2003, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2775771.stm (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
89 Senior Banker Expelled from Communist Party, PEOPLE'S DAILY, Nov. 6, 2002, available at
http://english.people.com.cn/200211/06/eng20021106_106322.shtml (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
90 Yunnan Sheng Yuan Shengzhang Li Jiating Shouhui An Yi Shen Bei Pan Sihuan [The Former
Governor of Yunnan Provinces Is Sentenced to Death With a Two- Year Reprieve for Accepting Bribes],
XINHUA NET, May 9, 2003, available at http:lwww.yn.xinhuanet.comlynnewslztl2003/szdllxlyml
news_001.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
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C. Anti-Corruption Campaign Data Show the Trend of Pursuing
High-Profile Cases and Neglecting Minor Cases
So far, this Article has examined the media coverage of the
ongoing campaigns. The media portray the war on corruption as a
successful way to fight corruption through extremely harsh punishment of
high level officials. However, because the media mainly focus on the
leadership's anti-corruption rhetoric and, more importantly, controversial
cases involving the downfall of major officials, it may only provide a
limited description of the anti-corruption campaigns. To provide a more
valid overview, we need to discuss a number of other sources. This
section analyzes the data on the development of anti-corruption
campaigns provided by the Supreme People's Procurate's annual work
reports to the NPC. While such data should be used with caution, it can
provide useful insights on the overall implementation of the campaigns,
including aspects overlooked by the media, as well as their historical
developments. The data show an increase in the number of high-profile
cases involving amounts over one million RMB, as well as cases
involving county or higher officials. However, while the overall number
of prosecuted cases grew at first, it has been dropping since 1997.
Considered with the media coverage described supra, there seems to be a
policy decision to prosecute more high-profile cases and fewer minor
corruption offenses.
Table 2 below presents an overview of the available data analyzed
in this article. It contains annual data on the campaigns as well as data
published every five years at the end of the NPC's term.
Table 2: Anti-Corruption Cam aign Data, 1988-200391
1988-1992 1996 1993-1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 1998-2002
Cases Total 214,318 61,099 387,352 35,084 38,382 45,113 36,447 207,103
Major Cases 81 156 617 n.a. n.a. 1,335 1,319 5,541
Officials County+ 4,629 2,699 3,175 1,820 2,200 2,680 2,670 12,830
Officials Provincial 5 5 7 3 3 7 6 19
Money Recovered 2.6 6.8 23 4.4 4.1 4.7 4.1 22
The table presents the history of corruption cases prosecuted by the
procurates. Figure 2 offers a graphic representation of the history
including the three Five-Year Plan periods. The table indicates that
during the five-year periods from 1988-1992 and 1993-1997, there have
91 The data presented in Table 2 is derived from the annual Work Reports of the Supreme
People's Procurate (SPP) for the years 1989-2003. These reports are available in Chinese online and
may be downloaded at http://www.spp.gov.cn/baogao/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
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been considerable increases in the number of prosecuted cases.92 They
seem to indicate that Jiang Zemin's repeated calls against corruption in
the mid-1990s had an effect.93 Another important factor in this period is
the number of cases based on citizen complaints. The Supreme People's
Procurate's annual reports provide information on the amount of public
participation in the campaigns. According to the 1998 report, citizens
made over 1.8 million reports on corruption related crimes between 1993
and 1998. More than 600,000 cases were investigated and approximately
268,710 of them were prosecuted.94 That means nearly seventy percent
of the prosecuted cases were initiated by citizen complaints. Reports on
later years, unfortunately, do not provide data on citizen complaints.95
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After 1997, a steep decline occurred in the number of prosecuted
cases. 97 During the 1998-1992 period, the number of prosecuted cases
decreased below those prosecuted during the 1988-1992 period. This
seems to be contrary to the increased emphasis on fighting corruption
expressed so often by the Chinese leadership in the media-as discussed
above. To understand how an increased emphasis on fighting corruption
can lead to a decrease in the number of cases handled, one must look at
other data in Table 2.
Figure 2 provides more information and a possible explanation to
the decline. It displays the data on the number of major cases, that is,
92 id.
93 id.
94 SIQING ZHANG, ZUIGAO RENMIN JIANCHAYUAN GONGZUO BAOGAO [SUPREME PEOPLE'S
PROCRURATE WORK REPORT], Mar. 10, 1998, available at http://www.spp.gov.cn/webscripts/
ReportRead.asp?ContentNumber=-0&ReportDate=19980310 (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
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those involving more than 100 million RMB. This figure shows that
there has been a tremendous increase in prosecution of cases of that size.
While the procurates scarcely dealt with such high-profile cases during
the first period, they increased prosecutions during the second period.
The real explosion in the prosecution of cases involving more than one
million RMB, however, came after 1997.98 This data, unfortunately, does
not tell us whether the increased number of prosecutions implies a
concomitant increase in the number of large corruption cases. It may
indicate, however, the stronger political will to prosecute such large cases.
It may be inferred from the development of anti-corruption politics that
the top-level leadership, after realizing the urgency, had decided in the
mid-1990s to pursue the prosecution of large cases and higher officials.
Figures 3 and 4 provide further information that illustrates this shift.
Figure 3 demonstrates that, following a decline in 1993-1997 and since
1998, there has been a sharp increase in cases involving cadre at county
or higher levels. This trend is even more prominent for provincial level
officials who were sparingly prosecuted before 1998.
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Figure 4: Officials at Provincial Level Prosecuted1 °°
1988-1992 1993-1997 1998-2002
Finally, Figure 5 shows that even though there have been fewer
cases in the last five years than in the preceding period, the amount of
money recovered by the campaigns declined only slightly.
100 See Work Reports of the Supreme People's Procurate, supra note 90.
1998-2002
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Figure 5: Total Amount of Public Funds Recovered (in billions RMB)1'




In short, there has been a decrease in the total number of
prosecuted cases, but an increase in the number of large cases involving
higher level officials. The difficulty with further analysis lies in the fact
that so far we do not know the nature of the link between prosecution and
corruption. To understand the issue better, one must go back to the
presentation of Transparency International's data in Table 1. Table 1
shows a sharp increase in perceived corruption after 1992. Then from
1995 to 1998, there is a slight decline in perceived corruption followed by
a relatively stable period from 1998 to 2002.102 The CPI data can shed
some light on the anti-corruption campaigns described above. First, there
is some overlap between the decrease of perceived corruption during the
1995-1998 period and the increase in corruption cases prosecuted in the
1993-1997 period.10 3 This means that the number of prosecuted cases
may lead to a decrease in perceived corruption. However, as explained
above, the strategy of prosecuting corruption cases changed. Since 1997,
the strategy has been to prosecute fewer cases, focusing on cases
involving large amounts and higher level officials. This change in
strategy, which led to the prosecution of more cases involving 100
million RMB or more or high-level officials, does not seem to have led to
a decrease in perceived corruption. Since 1997, perceived corruption
slightly increased, only to return back to its 1997 level in 2001 and 2002.
101 Id.
102 See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEXES, supra note 17.
103 Id.
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IV. ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS ARE POLITICO-LEGAL CAMPAIGNS TO
ENHANCE IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW
In this section we look how anti-corruption campaigns share many
characteristics with other political campaigns aimed at enhancing the
legal system. The analysis will demonstrate that short-term political
pressure is the only way to achieve implementation of law in China,
which has a system severely challenged by a high degree of autonomy
exercised by local and functional power holders. It will also demonstrate
that China's political legal campaigns can be a starting point for
reevaluating the relationship between law and politics in general--even
in more developed countries.
A. Local Autonomy Poses Challenges to Law-Making and
Implementation of Law in China
As discussed supra, the Chinese national leadership used the legal
system to organize anti-corruption campaigns. This is a good example of
the use of the legal system as an instrument for achieving political
goals. °4 One author points out that China's leadership recognised the
need to strengthen the legal system in order to effectively fight
corruption. 0 5 Anti-corruption campaigns, therefore, are also examples of
a phenomenon which has not yet been comprehensively studied in China:
the use of political methods and pressure to enhance implementation of
law. To understand this phenomenon let us first take a brief look at the
development of law in China since 1978 and how local and departmental
autonomy poses challenges to it.
In 1978, China initiated a reform program. The development or
redevelopment of the legal system constituted a central part of the reform.
Whereas in the pre-reform PRC the most important normative systems
were formed by CCP policy norms,'06 after 1978 national and local laws
and regulations came to substitute and/or complement CCP and State
policies. Legal reconstruction required legal institutions, including courts
and the legal profession, to be developed and reinforced. 0 7 Reform has
'4 For analysis of the relationship between anti-corruption efforts and legitimacy, see Carolyn L.
Hsu, Political Narratives and the Production of Legitimacy: The Case of Corruption in Post-Mao
China, 24 QUALITATIVE SOCIOLOGy 25 (2001). Chen has emphasized the instrumental conception of
law in China when describing China's legal development. See J. CHEN, CHINESE LAW, TOWARDS AN
UNDERSTANDING OF CHINESE LAW, ITS NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT 41, 356-358 (1999).
105 Yufan Hao, From Rule of Man to Rule of Law: An Unintended Consequence of Corruption in
China in the 1990s, 8 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA 402-425 (1999).
106 Perry Keller, Sources of Order in Chinese Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. LAW 711, 719 (1994).
107 For an overview of some of the problems of rebuilding such institutions, see William P.
Alford, Tasseled Loafers for Barefoot Lawyers: Transformation and Tension in the World of Chinese
Legal Workers, in CHINA'S LEGAL REFORMS 22 (Stanley B. Lubman ed., 1995); Donald C. Clarke,
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been directed at enhancing the legal consciousness of the people in
general. To achieve this, campaigns were organized to educate the
people about their basic rights. 10 The culmination of legal reform was
reached when Jiang Zemin, in his 1997 speech for the Fifteenth CCP
Congress, announced his policy to govern the country based on law (yifa
zhiguo), a notion which was subsequently codified in Art. 5 of the
Chinese Constitution in the 1999 amendments. 10 9 What this notion and
its codification will mean for China's legal development remains an
important question. China's legal development has been problematic in
several aspects. The Chinese legislation has been criticised for being too
vague, inconsistent, and inadequate."l 0 Furthermore, several interrelated
factors continue to hamper implementation of legislation: improving but
still underdeveloped legal professionals' and legal education system;
12
weak judicial institutions lacking well-qualified staff, 1 3 independence" 4
and integrity; 15a preference for extra-legal methods over litigation
among the general public; 116 and administrative institutions that lack rule
of law consciousness and mix law, policy and political power." 7 While
Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System: The Enforcement of Civil Judgments, 10 COLUM. J.
ASIAN L. 1 (1996); STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO
(1999); RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD THE RULE OF LAW (2002)
[hereinafter PEERENBOOM, LONG MARCH]; Randall Peerenboom, Law Enforcement and the Legal
Profession in China, in IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 43,
at 125 [hereinafter Peerenboom, Legal Profession].
1O8 Mechthild Exner, Convergence of Ideology and the Law: The Functions of the Legal
Education Campaign in Building a Chinese Legal System, ISSUES & STUDIES 68 (1995); Ronald J.
Troyer, Publicizing the New Laws: The Public Legal Education Campaign, in SOCIAL CONTROL IN THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 70 (Ronald J. Troyer et al. eds., 1989).
109 Jiang Zemin, LUN "SANGE DAIBIAO" [ON "THE THREE REPRESENTATIONS"] 326-29 (Beijing:
Zhonfyang Wenxian Chubanshe 2001).
'0 Keller, supra note 105, at 711; PETER HOWARD CORNE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA: THE
ADMINISTRATIVE LEGAL SYSTEM 95 (1997); Benjamin van Rooij, The Enforceability of Chinese Water
Pollution Regulations: What Room for Improvement?, 43 CHINA PERSP. 40, 50 (2002); Peerenboom,
Legal Profession, supra note 106, at 240; LUBMAN, supra note 106, at 149; TOWARD A GOVERNMENT
BY LAW, THEORETIC STUDIES AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE OF LAW 190
(Zou XIANG FAzHI ZHENGFU, YIFA XINGZHENG LILUN YANJIU YU SHiZHENG DIAOCHA) (S. Ying & S.
Yuan eds., 2001); William P. Alford & Benjamin L. Liebman, Clean Air, Clean Processes? The
Struggle over Air Pollution Lw in the People's Republic of China, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 703 (2001); Jan
Michiel Otto & Yuwen Li, An Overview of Law-Making in China, in LAW-MAKING IN THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1, 16-17 (Jan Michiel Otto et al. eds., 2000).
Alford, supra note 106; PEERENBOOM, LONG MARCH, supra note 106, at 164-75.
112 LUBMAN, supra note 106, at 151-52.
113 PEERENBOOM, LONG MARCH, supra note 106, at 281, 288-93.
14 Id. at 286, 294, 305, 306-7, 310-12, 318-19; LUBMAN, supra note 106, at 307.
"5 PEERENBOOM, LONG MARCH, supra note 106, at 295.
116 LUBMAN, supra note 106, at 307.
117 YING & YUAN, supra note 109, at 482; Hongjun Gao, Zhongguo Gongmin Quanli Yishi de
Yanjin [The Awakening of Rights Consciousness Among Chinese Citizens], in ZOU XIANG QUANLI DE
SHIDAI, ZHONGGUO GONGMN QUANtU FAZHAN YANJIU [TOWARDS A SOCIETY OF RIGHTS: RESEARCH
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CITIZEN'S RIGHTS IN CHINA] 105-6 (Yong Xia ed., 2000); Yuwen Li, Court
Reform in China: Problems, Progress and Prospects, in IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S
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the law has penetrated many layers of the social life in China in which it
previously had little or no impact, at the grass-roots level, the penetration
has remained superficial.118
One of the major factors behind the problems of the legal system
was the high level of local and departmental1 19 autonomy. In the early
1970s, after the chaotic period of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969),
local governments initiated a gradual process of change. 120 In 1978 the
state's new leadership took over the process and turned it into a reform
program. This introduced a number of changes to China's governance
structure, which increased the autonomy of governmental actors at all
administrative levels. First, economic reforms allowed the private sector
to develop under close supervision of the local governments. 122 This
created local sources of production and revenue outside of the centrally
controlled public sector. 123 Second, a change in the fiscal system
effectively decentralized tax revenue, shifting "powers away from central
government agencies to those at lower levels." 124 Third, the
administrative entities went through a number of changes such as
downsizing of the central state bureaucracy,' 25 partial separation of the
party and the state, 126 development of a professional and less ideological
civil service system, 127 and decentralization of leadership
appointments. 128 The professionalization of the bureaucracy, the decrease
in ideology-based appointments, and the increase of local appointments
129
have decreased the vertical CCP party cohesion throughout different
Diaocha Wei Li [Disputes and Legal Demand: Taking a Beijing Survey as a Case], JIANGSU SHEHUI
KEXUE [JIANGSU SOCIAL SCIENCE] 72-80 (2003).
"a H.L. Fu, Shifting Landscape of Dispute Resolution in Rural China, in IMPLEMENTATION OF
LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 43, at 179-80.
'19 "Local" here refers to geographical relative locality, such as a county in relation to a province,
while "departmental" refers to a functional locality, such as different governmental departments at the
provincial level.
120 TONY SAICH, GOVERNANCE AND POLITICS OF CHINA 52-56 (2001); 1 LYNN T. WHITE III,
UNSTATELY POWER: LOCAL CAUSES OF CHINA'S ECONOMIC REFORMS 13 (1998).
121 1 WHITE, supra note 119, at 13.
122 SHIPING ZHENG, PARTY VS. STATE IN POST-1949 CHINA: THE INSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA 216
(1997).
123 SAICH, supra note 119, at 52-54.
24 Id. at 152. See also ZHENG, supra note 121, at 216.
125 PEERENBOOM, LONG MARCH, supra note 106, at 205.
126 ZHENG, supra note 121, at 212-15.
127 Hong Yung Lee, China's New Bureaucracy, in STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE
CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM 56 (Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum ed., 1992); Caroline Haiyan Tong et al,
Civil Service Reform in the People's Republic of China: Case Studies of Early Implementation, 19 PUB.
ADMIN. & DEV. 193, 194 (1999); 2 LYNN T. WHITE HI, UNSTATELY POWER: LOCAL CAUSES OF
CHINA'S INTELLECTUAL, LEGAL AND GOVERNMENTAL REFORMS 485 (1998).
128 Cheng Li & David Bachman, Localism, Elitism, and Immobilism: Elite Formation and Social
Change in Post-Mao China, 42 WORLD POLITICS 64, 87 (1989); John P. Bums, China's Nomenklatura
System, PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM 36, 37-38 & 40-41 (1987).
129 Li & Bachman, supra note 127, at 86.
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levels of administration, creating local and departmental autonomy. 130
Fourth, the central government set up a system of self-government at the
rural grassroots level in 1987.131 During the 1990s, the officers at the
self-government were increasingly elected democratically. In 1998 the
new Organic Law on Village Committees further strengthened
democratic elections at the village level. Even though the CCP party
organization has remained central in village leadership, the system of
self-government has led to a near autonomous grassroots structure of up
to 900,000 villages. 132 In the past, governments at the township level had
direct vertical control over the village-level. Now villagers themselves
choose their own leaders, and, as a result, villages are less vertically
controlled.
These changes fragmented government power over different local
governments and bureaus (fragmented authoritarianism), 133 creating a
certain degree of local and departmental autonomy. Recent research,
however, revealed some exceptions: for high-priority policies, including
population control, economic development, and social stability, the
vertical and horizontal relationships were strengthened through CCP
party-responsibility systems and leadership bonus structures. 134  These
systems motivate local leadership to achieve priority policy goals through
job-performance-based incentives and sanctions. 135
Local and departmental autonomy had a dramatic impact on the
legal system. First, it hampered national law making by bestowing
bargaining power on various highly autonomous, influential provincial
governments and central departments. 136 Second, autonomous local
governments promulgated laws that conflicted with other (including
130 2 WHITE, supra note 126, at 510-11.
131 For an overview of this process, see Kevin J. O'Brien, Villagers' Committees: Implementing
Political Reform in China's Villages, 32 AUSTL. J. OF CHINESE AFF. 33 (1994); Kevin J. O'Brien &
Lianjiang Li, Accommodating "Democracy" in a One-Party State: Introducing Village Elections in
China, 162 CHINA Q. 465 (2000); Tianjian Shi, Village Committee Elections in China: Institutionalist
Tactics for Democracy, 51 WORLD POL. 385 (1999); Melanie Manion, The Electoral Connection in the
Chinese Countryside, 90 THE AM. POL. SC. REv. 736 (1996); Xu Wang, Mutual Empowerment of State
and Peasantry: Grassroots Democracy in Rural China, 25 WORLD DEV. 1431 (1997); Liu Yawei,
Consequences of Villager Committee Elections in China: Better Local Governance or More
Consolidation of State Power, 31 CHINA PERSP. 19 (2000).
132 O'Brien & Li, supra note 130, at 472; Liu, supra note 130, at 19.
133 Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Introduction: The "Fragmented Authoritarianism" Model and Its
Limitations, in BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND DECISION MAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA 1, 6-12
(Kenneth G. Lieberthal & David M. Lampton eds., 1992).
'34 See Maria Edin, State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management
From a Township Perspective, 173 CHINA Q. 35-52 (2003); Yasheng Huang, Central-Local Relations
in China During the Reform Era: The Economic and Institutional Dimensions, 24 WORLD DEV. 655
(1996).
135 Edin, supra note 133, at 35; Huang, supra note 133, at 24.
136 For an interesting case study that shows this for the field of environmental law, see Afford &
Liebman, supra note 109. For another case in which local interests and possible conflicts influenced
the lawmaking towards more vagueness, see Peter Ho, Who Owns China's Land? Policies, Property
Rights and Deliberate Institutional Ambiguity, 166 CHINA Q. 394 (2001).
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higher) legislation. 137 According to Keller, "the expansion of legislative
powers to so many central and regional state bodies has in effect brought
the rivalries and disorder in the Chinese bureaucracy into the legislative
structure." 1
38
Local autonomy also had an impact on the implementation of
law.' 39 Legal institutions such as the court and the procurate are funded
and controlled by local governments, which are relatively autonomous
from higher level governments. 140 This made the courts reluctant to
implement laws that are unfavorable to their local governments'
interests. 141 Proof of this can be found in the fact that citizens who appeal
local government decisions in court have a very slight chance of
winning.142 Furthermore, for many regulation type pieces of legislation,
it is not the courts, but the administrative agencies that act as
implementing authorities. Because of this broad local autonomy,
different parts of the bureaucracy have followed their own interests, and
in some cases have chosen not to implement the law in question, but only
pretend that they do so. Environmental law is a good example of an area
in which local governments shirk implementing the law by using their
relatively strong autonomy in order to protect their local interests. 1
43
B. Politico-Legal Campaigns Are Organized to Overcome Problems
in the Legal System
Since the beginning of the post-Mao legal reform program, China's
leadership has made use of political pressure to enhance its legal system,
which is increasingly troubled by local autonomy. These political
campaigns overcame local resistance and achieved unusual success in
implementing the law. For instance, in 2001 the police of Sichuan,
China's largest province with nearly one hundred million residents,
137 PEERENBOOM, LONG MARCH, supra note 106, at 256-57; Keller, supra note 105, at 733.
138 PEERENBOOM, LONG MARCH, supra note 106, at 256-57.
139 Clarke, supra note 106, at 41-9; LUBMAN, supra note 106, at 302-4.
140 For an overview of the literature on court independence, see PEERENBOOM, LONG MARCH,
supra note 106, at 298-318.
141 See id. at 314-15.
142 Minxin Pei, Citizens v. Mandarins: Administrative Litigation in China, 152 CHINA Q. 832
(1997).
143 Benjamin Van Rooij, Implementing Chinese Environmental Law through Enforcement: The
Shiwu Xiao and Shuangge Dabiao Campaigns, in IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 43, at 149 [hereinafter Van Rooij, Implementing Law Through
Enforcement]; Benjamin Van Rooij, Environmental Law Enforcement In Sichuan: Organization and
Procedure in Comparative Perspective, 17 CHINA INFO. 36 (2003) [hereinafter Van Rooij,
Environmental Law Enforcement]; Benjamin Van Rooij, Implementation of Chinese Environmental
Law: Regular Enforcement, Political Campaigns and Insights for Law and Development, in
DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE 4 (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript on file with author) [hereinafter Van
Rooij, Implementation of Environmental Law].
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solved 6706 crimes and apprehended 19,446 people, in just six days.' 44
Furthermore, between 1986 and 1990, approximately 640 million people
in China received education on its ten basic laws, including the
constitution, criminal law, civil law, marriage law, and succession law.
145
On August 13, 2003, forty-two million pirated CDs were destroyed
throughout China. 14 6 In the summer of 1996, China closed down around
60,000 heavily polluting small enterprises. 147  On June 26, 1996, the
International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking designated
by the United Nations General Assembly, it was reported that around
1.75 million people attended public rallies organized by the courts that
convicted 1725 criminals for drug-related crimes. 148 These seemingly
unrelated events share common characteristics. They are all short-term
political campaigns aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of the law-
politico-legal campaigns.
There have basically been two types of campaigns. The first type
is aimed at enhancing law enforcement through command and control
type methods. The most famous examples were the Strike Hard
campaigns 149 that imposed severe punishments upon criminals. These
campaigns attracted international attention because of the large number of
death penalties they brought--especially the last one in 2001.150 So far
there have been three large-scale Strike Hard campaigns-the first in
1983, the second in 1996, and the third that started in 2001. These
campaigns focused on harsh punishment of severe crimes. At the same
time there have been many smaller Strike Hard campaigns against
specific types of crimes, such as drug-related crimes in 1991, illegal
border-crossing in 1993, and car theft in 1998.151 There have also been
144 AMNESTY INT'L, CHINA: 'STRIKING HARDER' THAN EVER BEFORE, July 6, 2001, available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGASA 170222001 (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
145 Cheng Cai, Dui 'Guanyu Shenru Kaizhan Fazhi Xuanchuan Jiaoyu de Jueyi (Caoan)' de
Shuoming [Explanation to the (Draft) Opinion on Deepening and Developing Legal System
Propaganda and Education], 645 ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO GUOWUYuAN GONGBAO
[GAZETTE OF THE PRC STATE COUNCIL] 195 (1991).
146 Liu Weifeng, Huge Haul of Discs Destroyed, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 13, 2003, at 1.
147 Van Rooij, Implementing Law Through Enforcement, supra note 142, at 171.
148 Over One Million Attend Anti-drugs Rallies, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS: ASIA-
PACIFIC, June 28, 1996 (translating a June 26, 1996 report by Xinhua News Agency).
149 For an overview of the earlier strike hard campaigns, see generally HAROLD M. TANNER,
STRIKE HARD! ANTI-CRIME CAMPAIGNS AND CHINESE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1979-1985 (1999).
'50 AMNESTY INT'L, ONE THOUSAND EXECUTED IN "STRIKE HARD" CAMPAIGN AGAINST CRIME,
July 2, 1996, available at http:l/www.anmesty.itnews/1996/31707196.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2005);
AMNESTY INT'L, CHINA: "STRIKE HARD" ANTI-CRIME CAMPAIGN INTENSIFIES, July 23, 2002, available
at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA170292002?open&of=ENG-CHN (last visited Apr.
17, 2005); AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 143; AMNESTY INT'L, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: SERIOUS
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND THE CRACKDOWN ON DISSENT CONTINUE, Sept. 1, 2002, available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGASA 170472002 (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
151 Supreme People's Court, Zuigao Renminfayuan Guanyu Yange Zhixing (Quanguo Renmin
Daibiao da Hui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Jindu de Jueding) Yanzheng Dupin Fanzui Fenzi de
Tongzhi [Supreme People's Court Notice on Strictly Implementing the SCNPC Decision on Banning
Drugs and Strictly Punishing Drug Related Criminals], 25 GAZETTE OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT
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campaigns similar to the Strike Hard campaigns, but directed towards
other violations of law, that is, those that did not fall under ordinary
crimes. For example, there were campaigns against the Falun Gong,
15 2
copyright violation campaigns, 153 campaigns against illegal internet cafes
(after the explosion of an internet bar in 2002), 114 and, finally, campaigns
against environmental law violations.
55
The second type of politico-legal campaigns are campaigns
directed towards either enhancing the legal system as a whole, or just the
implementation of a single law through dissemination of legal knowledge
and raising people's awareness. The most important campaign of this
sort is the Pufa (legal dissemination) campaign, which aimed to educate
the Chinese public about various laws. This five-year campaign has been
organized four times since 1986.156 It provided basic legal education to
most Chinese. As early as 1989, one author noted that "ij]ust about every
Chinese citizen has been involved with or exposed to this campaign."
157
A special type of legal education and awareness campaign, the Pufa
campaign implemented the 1987 Organic Law on Village Committees
(OLVC, amended in 1998). During several rounds of the campaign, the
Ministry of Civil Affairs publicized this law and used public pressure to
overcome the local cadres' resistance to its implementation. 158
10 (1991); Supreme People's Court, Zuigao Renminfayuan Guanyu Yanlidaji Toudu Fanzui Huodong
de Tongzhi [Supreme People's Court Notice on Striking Hard Against Illegal Border Crossing], 36
GAZETTE OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT 147 (1993); Supreme People's Court et al., Zuigao Renmin
Fayuan Zuigao Jianchayuan Gonganbu Guojia Gongshang Xingzheng Guanliju Guanyu Yinfa
(Guanyu Yifa Chachu Daoqie Qianglie Jidongche Anjian de Guiding) de Tongzhi [SPC, SPP, PSB and
SBIC Notice on the Issuing of the Regulation on the Robbery and Theft of Motor Vehicles], 55
GAZETrE OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT (1998).
152 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DANGEROUS MEDITATION: CHINA'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST
FALUNGONG 21, 27-28, 34, 36, 40 (2002).
153 Campaign Against Software Piracy, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 18, 2001, available at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2001-10/18/content_89092.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2005);
Authorities Taking "Stem Action" Against Copyright Pirates, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS:
ASIA-PACIFIC, May 12, 1996 (translating a May 11, 1996 report by Xinhua News Agency); Beijing
Police Make "Largest-ever" Illegal CD Seizure, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS: ASIA-
PACIFIC, May 12, 1996 (translating a May 9, 1996 report by Xinhua News Agency); Police Ordered to
Crack Down on Piracy of Copyrights, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS: ASIA-PACIFIC, May
24, 1996 (translating a May 24, 1996 report by Xinhua News Agency) [hereinafter Police Ordered to
Crack Down]; USA, China Avert Trade War Over Copyright, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS:
ASIA-PACIFIC, June 17, 1996 (translating a June 17, 1996 report by Xinhua News Agency); Wang Ying,
Campaign Against Pirated Products Intensifies, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 17, 2001; Jamila Zhou, Anti-
counterfeit Move Threatens Silk Alley, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 11, 2001.
154 Lokman Tsui, The Panopticon as the Antithesis of a Space of Freedom: Control and
Regulation of the Internet in China, 17 CHINA INFO. 65, 71 (2003).
155 Van Rooij, Implementing Law Through Enforcement, supra note 142, at 169-177; Van Rooij,
Implementation of Environmental Law, supra note 142, at 7-9.
156 For an overview of the earlier campaigns, see Troyer, supra note 107, at 70-83; Exner, supra
note 107, at 68-102.
157 Troyer, supra note 107, at 70.
15s Jinchi Gu, Yifa Zuohao Cunweihui Huanjie Xuanju (Tanyuan yu Sikao) [Implementing the
Next Round of Village Committee Elections Based on Law (Causes and Ideas)], PEOPLE'S DAILY, Apr.
10, 2002; MINISTRY OF CIVIL AFFAIRS, XINBAN "ZHONGHUARENMIN GONGHEGUO CUNMIN
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C. Anti-Corruption Campaigns Are a Type of Politico-Legal
Campaign
China's politico-legal campaigns share common characteristics.
First, political power starts to support the law during the campaigns.
159
Whereas in certain cases bureaucratic or local resistance would normally
make implementation of the law impossible, the political pressure of the
campaign ensures results, at least temporarily. 16° It is not yet entirely
clear how this works, but it is plausible to assume that the aims of the
campaign (such as implementation of certain laws and regulations)
become part of the policy priorities that form the basis on which
bureaucratic leadership gets evaluated, rewarded and disciplined through
the cadre responsibility and the civil service systems.' 61
Second, in some cases, political power holders start the campaign
by changing the existing legislation to allow for stricter enforcement.
62
For example, during the first Strike Hard campaign in 1983, the Criminal
Code was amended to allow for more "severe punishments, including the
death sentence, on offenders who cause grave harm to public order."'
163
WEIYUANHUI XUANJU GUIZHANG" JINRI CHUBAN [TODAY WE PUBLISH A NEW EDITION OF THE "PRC
MEASURES ON VILLAGE COMMITTEE ELECTIONS"], available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/
2001-11/29/content_139360.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2005). For an overview of the literature on
earlier campaigns and elections, see O'Brien, supra note 130, at 33-59; O'Brien & Li, supra note 130;
Shi, supTra note 130; Manion, supra note 130; Xu, supra note 130; Liu, supra note 130.
9 XIAOPING DENG, DENG XIAOPING WENXUAN DISAN JUAN [SELECTED WORKS OF DENG
XIAOPING, VOLUME 3] 33 (1993); Meng Yan, Criminal Gangs Targeted in Strikes, CHINA DAILY, Nov.
24, 2001; O'Brien & Li, supra note 130; Public Security Minister Urges Learning from Guangdong on
Serious Crime Cases, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS: ASIA-PACIFIC, May 30, 1996
(translating Chou Lang-jo, Tao Siju Urges Various Localities to Learn from Guangdong's Experiences
in Swiftly Striking Heavy Blows at Major Cases, WEN WEI PO); Luo Urges Continuation of "Strike-
Hard" Campaign, CHINA DAILY, July 20, 2003, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/
doc/2003-07/20/content_246461.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2005); President Hu Calls for Efforts in
"Strike-Hard" Campaign, Xinhua News Agency, June 28, 2003, available at
http://test.china.org.cn/english/China/68372.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2005); Gu, supra note 157; State
Council, Guowuyuan guanyu Huanjing Baohu ruogan Wenti de Jueding [State Council Decision on
Several Problems Concerning Environmental Protection], ENVIRONMENTAL WORK NEWS REPORT
(1996); Police Ordered to Crack Down, supra note 152; Politburo Member Hu Jintao Calls for Broad
Participation in Crime Crackdown, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS: ASIA-PACIFIC, May 6,
1996 (translating a report by Xinhua News Agency); Ying, supra note 152; Van Rooij, Implementing
Law Through Enforcement, supra note 142, at 170; Van Rooij, Implementation of Environmental Law,
supra note 142, at 7; Troyer, supra note 107, at 73.
160 For the clearest example, see Van Rooij, Implementing Law Through Enforcement, supra note
142, at 170-77; Van Rooij, Implementation of Environmental Law, supra note 142, at 7-9.
161 This assumption is based on the author's interviews with environmental enforcement agents
conducted in Kunming in 2004. See also Edin, supra note 133, at 35, 52.
162 Zhiguo An, On Capital Punishment, 45 BEUNG REv. 4 (1983), quoted in Beijing Review
Article Explains Capital Punishment, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS: ASIA-PACIFIC, Nov.
15, 1983, at KI; BARRETr L. MCCORMICK, POLITICAL REFORM IN POST-MAO CHINA: DEMOCRACY
AND BUREAUCRACY IN A LENINIST STATE 108-109 (1990); Pitman B. Potter, Belief in Control:
Regulation of Religion in China, 174 CHINA Q. 317, 331 (2003).
163 An, supra note 161, at 4.
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Another 1983 Strike Hard amendment was the suspension of the right to
appeal a death sentence to the Supreme People's Court.64
Third, national policymakers choose which laws and which aspects
of the laws are to be the focus of the campaign.' 65  Campaigns thus
provide political choices on how to allocate the limited implementation
resources. After making these choices, the central political leadership
communicates and implements it uniformly throughout the campaign's
target area.
The fourth aspect is that the campaigns provide a standard working
procedure. Most campaigns begin by selecting their participants and
preparing the main policy documents. 166 At the beginning of some
campaigns, local officials evaluate the relevant local issues, and central
level policymakers turn the issues into solution proposals on the basis of
these evaluations. 167  Governmental officials involved in the campaign
then initiate implementation throughout China. Finally, at every level of
implementation, officials have to evaluate the progress and report to the
higher level, and are sometimes inspected. 168 Some campaigns focus on
learning from the best local practices. 169 They can be either major
1- McCORMICK, supra note 161, at 108-109.
165 Yan, supra note 158; Supreme People's Court, Zuigao Renminfayuan Bangongting Zhuanfa
Guojia Shangjianju Gonganbu (Guanyu Yanli DaJi Bufafenzi Weizao Bianzao Maimai Shangjian
Danzheng Xingwei de Tongzhi) de Tongzhi [Supreme People's Court Office Notice Transmitting the
State Commodities Bureau and Public Security Bureau Notice on Striking Hard Against Illegal
Forging, Alteration or Sale of Commodity Documents], 14 GAZETTE OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT
17 (1988); Van Rooij, Implementation Through Enforcement, supra note 142, at 170-77; Van Rooij,
Implementing Environmental Law, supra note 142, at 7-9.
166 MCCORMICK, supra note 161, at 106; Gu, supra note 157; CCP CC BUREAU & STATE
COUNCIL BUREAU, ZHONGGONG ZHONGYANG BANGONGTING GUowUYUAN BANGONGTING FAZHU
TONGZHI JIN YEBU ZUOHAO CUNMIN WEIYUANHui HUANJIE XUANJU GONGZUO [THE CCP CENTRAL
COMMrrrEE BUREAU AND STATE COUNCIL BUREAU ISSUE A NOTICE ON STRENGTHENING THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UPCOMING ROUND OF VILLAGE COMMITEE ELECTIONS], available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2002-08/19/content_529523.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2005); Van
Rooij, Implementing Environmental Law, supra note 142, at 7-9; Hansheng Shi, Quanguo "Er Wu"
Pufa Jingyan Jiaoliu Huiyi [Conference to Exchange Experiences With Regard to the National Second
Five-Year Legal Dissemination Campaign], 1994 LAW YEARBOOK 163 (1994).
167 See, e.g., Van Rooij, Implementing Environmental Law, supra note 142, at 7-9.
168 Wang Ying, Capital Succeeds in Crackdown on Crimes, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 1, 2001. Van
Rooij, Implementation Through Enforcement, supra note 142, at 175; Van Rooij, Implementing
Environmental Law, supra note 142, at 7-9; Ministry of Civil Affairs, Guanyu Choubei Zhaokai
Quanguo Cunweihui Xuanju Qingkuang Fenxihui de Tongzhi [Decision on Preparing for Convening a
Meeting on the Circumstances of Village Committee Elections], available at http://www.china
vitlage.org/readnews.asp?newsid= I FEB 8B028-BAF3-1 1D6-A7FA-009027DDFA 1E I (last visited Apr.
17, 2005); Fan Yang, Destroying 800,000 Illegal CDs, W. CHINA CITY NEWS, Dec. 3, 2001; Zhenhuai
Yao, Quanguo Renda Changweihui Jiancha "Er Wu" Pufa Jueyi Zhixing Qingkuang [SCNPC Inspects
the Implementation of Opinion on the Second Five Year Legal Dissemination], 1996 LAW YEARBOOK
181 (1996).
169 O'Brien, supra note 130, at 41; Public Security Minister Urges Learning from Guangdong on
Serious Crime Cases, supra note 158; Troyer, supra note 107, at 74; Yu Zou, Guanyu 1986 Nian
Guanche Shishi Quanguo Renda Changweihui (Zai Gongminzhong Jiben Puji Falii Changshi de Jueyi)
Qingkuang de Baogao [Report on the Circumstances of Implementation in 1986 of the SCNPC Opinion
on the Basic Dissemination of Legal Knowledge Among the People], 1988 LAW YEARBOOK 675 (1987).
For environmental enforcement campaigns, a local practice from Zhejiang province to involve local
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violation cases in enforcement type campaigns, or exemplary cases in
education and propaganda campaigns. An additional issue is public
involvement. Most campaigns make use of the mass population to
enhance their effectiveness.1 7  They do this either directly through
education or indirectly through telephone hotlines, which allow citizens
to voice complaints about violations, as well as through the reports on
campaign progress and publication of model cases.
In sum, anti-corruption campaigns are politico-legal campaigns
because they share these characteristics. As speeches by Jiang Zemin and
other top leaders demonstrate, anti-corruption campaigns have been
supported by political pressure. The anti-corruption campaigns have
introduced specific legislation to enhance the law's effectiveness.
Political choices to go after the high-profile corruption crimes have led to
the prosecution of cases involving large amounts of money and high level
officials while decreasing the total number of cases. Finally, the
campaigns have involved the general public, through the constant media
coverage of leadership speeches and major cases.
D. Politico-Legal Campaigns Share Characteristics with Maoist Mass
Movements
The anti-corruption campaign is a typical form of politico-legal
campaign in China. At first blush, politico-legal campaigns seem to be a
phenomenon characteristic of communist China. In fact, they share many
characteristics with the mass movements (Yundong) organized under
Mao.171 Mao's movements were also organized to achieve certain goals
within a limited amount of time in certain localities. For this purpose, the
central goals and tasks of the movement were drawn up. Just as in
contemporary politico-legal campaigns, Mao first established the key
points (zhong dian), activists (jiji fenzi), and backbone elements (gugan
fenzi)172 of the movement. Next, the tasks and key points were assigned
farmers as inspection agents was propagated as a preferred method in the 2002 campaign. Based on
the author's personal correspondence with an anonymous official at the State Environmental Protection
Agency (SEPA), Beijing, 2002.
170 O'Brien & Li, supra note 130, at 482-483; AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 143; China 'Outstrips
World' on Executions, BBC NEWS, July 6, 2001, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/asia-
pacific/1425570.stm (last visited Apr. 17, 2005); 150 Heroic Citizens Rewarded, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 27,
2001; Van Rooij, Implementation of Environmental Law, supra note 142, at 8; CCP CC BUREAU &
STATE CoUNCIL BUREAU, supra note 165; Hansheng Shi, Siwu Pufa Yinianjian [The Fourth Five-Year
Legal Dissemination Campaign's First Year], available at http://www.legalinfo.gov.cn/joa/shifadong
tai/sfdt2002050901.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
171 See GORDON A. BENNET, YUNDONG: MASS CAMPAIGNS IN CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP
(1976); CHARLES P. CELL, REVOLUTION AT WORK: MOBILIZATION CAMPAIGNS IN CHINA (1977).
172 Activists are those who have proved their worth in political work or previous campaigns and
are selected to incite the masses to participate in the present campaign. Backbone elements are selected
by the campaign leadership to form the bridge between them and the activists. They are selected from
among the best cadres. See Bennet, supra note 171, at 41-42.
VOL. 14 No. 2
CHINA'S WAR ON GRAFT
top-down throughout the designated locality. In this manner, movements
initiated at the highest level of leadership spread downward until they
reached the lowest levels.
Also similar to politico-legal campaigns, Mao's movements had a
certain work program to implement their agenda. During the movements,
local units studied the movement's main tasks with publications made for
this purpose. The next step at the local level was recruiting activists and
leaders to stimulate and manage the movement. Afterwards, the local
unit would continue to collect data on how local problems relate to the
movement. The subsequent step was less peaceful than today's politico-
legal campaigns. The movement participants engaged in public censures,
and in some cases, violence (douzheng). However, the utilized
methods-public participation and mass mobilization-were similar.
Finally, the movements ended with summarized reports of the movement.
Central leadership evaluated the movement's success and rewarded
successful activists.
173
Despite these similarities, there are also differences between Mao's
movements and today's politico-legal campaigns. In the pre-reform
period, movements were highly ideological and politicized. The higher
aim of the movements was class struggle and revolution. The frequent
use of these large-scale mass mobilization movements, implemented
through public censures and violent struggles, left a profound impact on
Chinese society. As one author writes, "mass campaigns turned the
whole nation against itself.'
174
Because of their similarities with Mao's mass mobilization
movements, one may be inclined to think that politico-legal campaigns
are unique to the PRC. The following Part, however, reveals that similar
phenomena exist outside of China.
V. SIMILARITIES EXIST BETWEEN THE POLITICO-LEGAL CAMPAIGNS IN
CHINA AND LEGAL REACTIONS TO CRISES IN THE UNITED STATES
A broader analysis shows that the need for an effective legal
system brings political power into the legal realm. In the West, this
usually happens when there is a sense of crisis that is either related to the
law itself or requires the law for its resolution. When a crisis occurs,
political power holders push for stricter legislation and tougher
enforcement. They introduce new enforcement priorities, allocate extra
resources for the enforcement, and sometimes mobilize the general public.
Several examples of this phenomenon from the United States show that,
173 See id. at 38-45.
174 ZHENG, supra note 121, at 156.
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in times of crisis, a need for effective law suppresses civil liberties,
including the principles of due process and freedom of speech.
A. The Prohibition Is an Example of the Use of Law in Times of Crisis
The first example of the use of political power for crisis resolution
in the United States is the national prohibition on drinking mandated by
the Eighteenth Amendment in 1917, and later repealed in 1933. The
Prohibition is a story of the use of law as an instrument to deal with a
social crisis involving conflicting moral values, and to promote a stronger
and more progressive federal government. It demonstrates how the social
crisis led to strict legislation and attempts at strict enforcement that were
doomed to fail because of their lack of legitimacy. The Prohibition set a
model of criminalizing certain behavior based on the moral values of one
social group. It juxtaposed the majority of law-abiding citizens against
the minority of criminal elements.
In the nineteenth century, many Americans, especially rural, small-
town Protestants, believed that "Demon Rum explained almost all of
society's ills, from poverty and unemployment to prostitution, wife
beating, and murder." ' 5 This personal belief turned into a patriotic value
when Irish and German drinking immigrants started to arrive in the
1850s. 17 6 After the turn of the century, the U.S. witnessed the rise of a
new generation of progressive leaders seeking to increase government
power in the face of social ills including insobriety. 177 Under the pressure
of national lobby groups such as the Anti-Saloon League and "the hyper
patriotic fervor of the first world war,"178 state laws prohibiting alcohol
spread until they culminated in the Eighteenth Amendment in 1917.171 In
1919, the National Prohibition Act180 banned drinks with more than 0.5
percent alcohol. Prohibition, however, did not have support throughout
the country and its implementation was difficult. 181 Still, year after year,
presidents pushed for strict enforcement and called on the public for
support. In 1925, for example, President Calvin Coolidge, in his third
annual address stated:
Under the orderly processes of our fundamental institutions
the Constitution was lately amended providing for national
175 W.J. Rorabaugh, Reexamining the Prohibition Amendment, 8 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 285, 288
(1996).
176 id.
177 Id. at 286-7.
178 HARRY G. LEVINE & CRAIG REINARMAN, ALCOHOL PROHIBITION AND DRUG PROHIBMON:
LESSONS FROM ALCOHOL POLICY FOR DRUG POLICY 2 (2004).
179 Rorabaugh, supra note 174, at 291-93.
"0 4 1 Stat. 305 (1919).
i1 Rorabaugh, supra note 174, at 293.
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prohibition. The Congress passed an act for its enforcement,
and similar acts have been provided by most of the States. It
is the law of the land. It is the duty of all who come under its
jurisdiction to observe the spirit of that law, and it is the duty
of the Department of Justice and the Treasury Department to
enforce it... I request of the people observance, of the
public officers continuing efforts for enforcement, and of the
Congress favorable action on the budget recommendation
for the prosecution of this work.'82
The federal government made the enforcement of Prohibition a
priority, spending millions of dollars on it, while losing over a billion
dollars in tax revenue from foregone taxation of spirits. 183 However, the
Prohibition lacked legitimacy with America's urban and immigrant
population and was violated everywhere. Enforcement was not only
impossible, but encouraged the development of black markets and
organized crime.' 84 In hindsight, it is surprising that it took sixteen years
before the Eighteenth Amendment was repealed in 1933. 185 Still,
Prohibition remains a model of the interaction between law and politics in
a time of crisis.
B. The Red Scare Resulted in an Initial Suppression of the Freedom of
Speech But Also in the Development of Justice
After the end of World War II, the swift spread of communism in
Eastern Europe and Asia and evidence of communist espionage activities
at home "generated a full-blown Red Scare" in the U.S.186 Because the
Cold War stand-off soon precluded direct actions against communism
abroad, attention turned to communists in the United States.' 8
7
The American leadership reacted to this sense of crisis by
introducing strict anti-communist legislation and limiting the rights of
minority groups in order to soothe the fears of the majority. First, there
was the 1947 Executive Order 9835188 that "subjected all present and
prospective federal employees in each department and agency of the
182 President Calvin Coolidge, Third Annual Message (Dec. 8, 1925), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29566&st=locarno&stl (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
183 Charles H. Whitebread, Freeing Ourselves from the Prohibition Idea in the Twenty-First
Century, 33 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 235, 239 (2000).
's" Id. at 239-40.
185 U.S. CONST. Amend. XXI, § 1.
116 Michael E. Parrish, A Lawyer in Crisis Times: Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., the Loyalty-Security
Program, and the Defense of Civil Liberties in the Early Cold War, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1799, 1806 (2004).
187 Id. at 1807.
188 Exec. Order No. 9,835, 3 C.F.R. 129 (Supp. 1947), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 3301,
7301 (2005).
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executive branch to the potential investigation by the F[ederal] B [ureau of]
I[nvestigation] to determine whether evidence existed such that
'reasonable grounds exist for belief that the person... is disloyal to the
Government of the United States."' 189 Congress also amended the
National Labor Relations Act to "eliminate Communists from labor union
leadership positions" in 1947.190 In 1950, Congress adopted the Internal
Security Act19 1 requiring certain types of communist organizations, as
defined in the Act, to register with the Attorney General-with serious
penalties for failure to do so. 192 Because of the 1950 Act, federal
immigration law was amended to ban communist aliens. 193 The new
legislation failed to dispel the national fear of communism and soon there
was pressure to do more. 194 This led to a bill proposing to make
membership in the communist party a crime, which passed the Senate,
but did not make it through the House of Representatives. 195 In 1954,
Congress enacted the Communist Control Act 196 that "categorized the
Communist Party of the United States as an 'instrumentality of a
conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the United States,' and
declared that 'its role as the agency of a hostile foreign power renders its
existence a clear present and continuing danger to the security of the
United States."",197 The new Act revoked the special rights, privileges and
immunities enjoyed by the Communist Party as a political party.
The new legislation opened the path for enforcement actions
against suspected communists or communist-sympathizers. The new
laws gave anti-communist enforcers unprecedented powers to invade the
professional and personal lives of U.S. citizens. The Red Scare crisis also
led to an increased enforcement of existing legislation. The Smith Act of
1940198 provided punishments of up to twenty years in prison for those
who advocated the overthrowing of the U.S. government.199 Prosecutions
under this Act started in 1948-during the Red Scare crisis-when the
first indictment under the Act was filed in New York.200 During the early
189 Parrish, supra note 185, at 1807 (quoting Exec. Order 9,835, 3 C.F.R. 627, 630 (1943-1948)).
190 Marc Rohr, Communists and the First Amendment: The Shaping of Freedom of Advocacy in
the Cold War Era, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1, 13 (1991).
191 Internal Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 987 (1950) (formerly codified in
scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.) (repealed).
192 Rohr, supra note 189, at 14.
193 id.
'94 Id. at 15.
195 Id.
'9 69 Stat. 775 (1954).
197 Alan I. Bigel, The First Amendment and National Security. The Court Responds to
Governmental Harassment of Alleged Communist Sympathizers, 19 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 885, 904-05
(1993) (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 841 (1955 Supp.)).
'9' 54 Stat. 670, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1994).
199 Rohr, supra note 189, at 11-12.
200 Id. at 18.
VOL. 14 No. 2
CHINA'S WAR ON GRAFT
and mid- 1950s, a number of prosecutions took place throughout the
country and many ended in convictions.2 °1
The liberal society soon felt the effects of the new laws and the
Red Scare enforcement activities. At first, constitutional challenges of the
new laws were often unsuccessful because the Red Scare seemed to have
affected the bench as well. For example, when the question of whether
the 1940 Smith Act violated the First Amendment arose, the Supreme
Court of the United States initially held it did not. In Dennis v. United
States, Justice Hugo Black portrayed the situation as follows:
Public opinion being what it now is, few will protest the
conviction of these Communist petitioners. There is hope,
however, that in calmer times, when present pressures,
passions and fears subside, this or some later Court will
restore the First Amendment liberties to the high preferred
place where they belong in a free society.202
It was not until 1957 in Yates v. United States that the Supreme
Court brought a first halt to the Red Scare prosecutions by overturning
fourteen Smith Act convictions.2 3 Subsequent cases in the 1960s made
Red Scare-related prosecutions increasingly difficult. 2°4 The fear finally
subsided in the late 1960s and communism-related legislation and legal
actions left the center stage of law and politics.
C. The War on Drugs Changed Legislation and Law Enforcement and
Even Influenced the Courts
In the late 1960s another crisis emerged in the United States: the
increased use of drugs that, according to President Richard Nixon, had
grown "into a serious national threat to the personal health and safety of
millions of Americans. 20 5 In 1969, Nixon delivered a special message to
Congress and urged an increase in the national awareness of the gravity
of the situation.206
The Nixon administration started a "War on Drugs," criminalizing
drug related activities with tougher legislation. The path of the war on
drugs followed the prohibition model by defining drug use as a moral and
201 Id. at 19-20.
202 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 581 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting).
203 See Rohr, supra note 189, at 20-21.
204 Id. at 91-96
205 President Richard Nixon, 266 Special Message to the Congress on Control of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs, July 14, 1969, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=21
26&st=drugs&st l=enforcement (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
206 Id.
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criminal problem and aiming at ending it through legal methods. °7 All
administrations since Nixon continued the fight. Since the 1980s in
particular, there has been an increase in mandatory federal and state
legislation prescribing harsh penalties for relatively minor offenses.
20 8
The prohibition model also required investing enormous amounts
of financial resources into law enforcement. The Nixon Administration,
for instance, established the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA").209 The
war on drugs led to more enforcement efforts in the 1970s and 1980s, and
intensified even further since the late 1980s.21° By 1998, the war on
21drugs devoured over US $68 billion. ' 1 In 1999 alone, the Clinton
administration's budget included nearly US $18 billion on drug
enforcement activities; this number did not include the costs of
incarcerating inmates that amounted to nearly US $20.3 billion-more
than US $32,000 per inmate-in 1990.
212
The perceived drug crisis and the resulting war on drugs, just as the
Red Scare, tested the constitutional limits of law enforcement. There has
been "a growing tendency in the courts to create a 'drug war exception'
to the Bill of Rights. 213 Courts have allowed enforcement actions while
"narrowing constitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches and
seizures, condoning warrantless searches and the use of racially charged
drug courier profiles, and countenancing draconian civil forfeiture
provisions in ever more severe drug laws. 2 14 The sense of a national
crisis around drug-abuse and the demand for effective legal action have
strained the ordinary formal-rational limits on governmental action laid
down in the rule of law doctrines and in the U.S. Constitution.
Drugs are still rampant and drug-trafficking remains a big business.
21
Most scholars now agree that the War on Drugs was a failure. 2 15 Scholars
point out the "profit paradox" (enforcement inflates the drug price) that
shows how increased enforcement actually makes drug trafficking more
216profitable. Another problem is the "hydra effect" or "push down/pop-
up" phenomenon, which suggests that strict enforcement only spreads the
217problem from one place to another. The War on Drugs still continues,
207 See Kevin F. Ryan, Clinging to Failure: The Rise and Continued Life of the U.S. Drug Policy,
32 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 221, 222 (1998).
208 Charles H. Whitebread, Freeing Ourselves from the Prohibition Idea in the Twenty-First
Century, 33 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 235, 247-48 (2000).
209 Jonathan M. Barnett, The Rational Underenforcement of Vice Laws, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 423,
476 (2002).
2 0 See id.
211 Ryan, supra note 207, at 223.
212 Whitebread, supra note 208, at 246-47.
213 Ryan, supra note 207, at 226-27.
214 Id. at 227.
215 For an overview of the literature, see id. at 224.
216 Id.
217 id
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and it has been argued that it will not end until the political debate over
drug control and drug usage changes.
218
D. "Broken Windows" and Community Policing Give the Police a
Large Amount of Discretion and Cause Unequal Enforcement
The crisis of drug-related crimes and inner-city crimes in the U.S.
led to a new approach to law enforcement: Zero Tolerance. This new
approach was based on the so-called "Broken-Windows" theory that links
disorder with crime. According to the theory, preventing crime starts
with eliminating signs of disorder. 219 Translated into a criminal
enforcement context, this implies emphasizing harsh punishments for
minor transgressions.
Rudolph Giuliani, as the new mayor of the City of New York, was
among the first to use this new law enforcement strategy to put an end to
the crime spiral that had plagued the city for years. He introduced the
"quality of life initiative" as an enforcement program. The city
"increased its law enforcement budget, hired a slew of new police officers,
and began to aggressively prosecute minor misdemeanors such as
turnstile jumping and public drinking. ' 220  The city's new political
leadership changed the enforcement priorities by utilizing its political
powers and financial resources.
Many were happy to see New York's crime rates decline so rapidly.
Only two years after the initiative had started, the murder rate dropped
forty percent, robberies over thirty percent, and burglaries twenty-five
percent. 221 Others, however, questioned whether Zero Tolerance
strategies were the true cause of the rapid decline of crime rates in New
York. 
22
There was also criticism concerning the constitutionality of the
Zero Tolerance policies that focused on the amount of discretion given to
enforcement agents. Such discretion, one scholar argued, eroded due
process requirements such as probable cause and reasonable suspicion as
predicates for detentions and searches.223 Critics also claimed that the
218 See Aaron Clemens, Removing the Market for Lying Snitches: Reforms to Prevent Unjust
Convictions, 23 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 151, 152-156 (2004).
219 Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception
of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97
MICH. L. REV. 291, 302 (1998) (quoting James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29).
220 Emesto Palomo, "The Sheriff Knows Who the Troublemakers Are. Just Let Him Round Them
Up": Chicago's New Gang Loitering Ordinance, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 729, 738-39 (2002).
221 Id. at 739.
222 Jefferey Fagan et al., Declining Homicide in New York City: A Tale of Two Trends, 88 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINoLoGY 1277, 1319 (1998).
223 Philip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM URBAN L. J. 441 (2000).
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application of the Zero Tolerance policy was discriminatory because it
was "not about disorderly places, nor about improving the quality of life,
but about policing poor people in poor places. 224 African American
citizens especially carried the risk of being targeted by Zero Tolerance
225
enforcement. Again, the pressure to solve a crisis through the law
imperiled formal legal constraints on the legal action.
E. School Shootings Led to New Legislation and Mandatory
Expulsions in Tension with Due Process
The second example of the zero tolerance strategy is where it was
adopted to resolve the crisis related to public school violence that plagued
the U.S. throughout the 1990s. A series of high school shootings
involving teenage shooters and victims 226 shocked the nation and
threatened its basic sense of security because they involved a presumed
haven from mortal violence-the school. On September 11, 1999,
President Bill Clinton declared in a national radio address that:
It's ... a time of concern-concern that when our children
walk through the schoolhouse door they won't be safe from
the threat of violence... We know the vast majority of our
schools are safe, but we can't forget the communities in
cities, suburbs, and rural areas that do have a serious
problem with school violence. And we can't forget that even
one incident of school violence is one too many. The tragic
shootings of the past 2 years were a wakeup call, an urgent
reminder that to protect our children from violence, we need
nothing less than a national campaign that draws on all our
resources and demands all our commitment, with all of us
taking responsibility.2
27
Scholars predicting that the problem will worsen further fueled the
sense of crisis. One scholar, John Dilulio, described the youth crime as a
"time bomb [that] cannot be defused.., forty million kids ten years old
224 Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Shops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder
in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457 (2000).
225 id.
226 Kevin P. Brady, Zero Tolerance or (In)Tolerance Policies? Weaponless School Violence, Due
Process, and the Law of Student Suspensions and Expulsions: An Examination of Fuller v. Decator
Public School Board of Education School District, 2002 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 159, 159-60 (2002).
227 William J. Clinton, The President's Radio Address, PUB. PAPERS 1519 (1999).
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,,228and under [growing up] fatherless, godless and jobless. He claimed
that such kids would soon become "super-predators. 229
To deal with this ongoing crisis, Congress enacted a new law-the
Revised 1994 Gun-Free Schools Act. Under this Act, "each
State... shall have in effect a State law requiring local educational
agencies to expel from school for a period of not less than one year a
student who is determined to have brought a weapon to school. 2 3 ° States
soon enacted their own legislation prohibiting "weapons," as defined in
the 1994 Act, in schools. 23 1 As the crisis continued with more accidents
occurring in the second half of the 1990s, an increasing number of school
districts and their boards adopted stricter zero tolerance policies. In order
to reassure parents, these new policies "mandated that students be
excluded from school, often for up to a full calendar year, for bringing
weapons to school, or committing certain other acts, leaving little or no
discretion to those assigning disciplinary consequences." ' 232 School
districts and boards soon expanded the mandatory expulsions to include
non-weapon related behavior such as the possession of drugs, alcohol,
tobacco,233 "and a host of other student behaviors that many would argue
cause no threats or safety concerns to schools., 234 By 1998, seventy-nine
percent of public schools had adopted zero tolerance policies for tobacco,
eighty-seven percent for alcohol, and eighty-eight percent for drugs.
235
The school violence crisis also influenced the criminal justice system.
During the 1990s, a number of states changed their criminal procedure
laws to make it easier to prosecute juveniles under the procedure for adult
236
criminals. One scholar writes: "these youthful offenders might now
receive both a criminal record and a prison sentence, producing the severe





As a consequence of the policy, school boards suspended and
expelled a surprising number of students. In 1998, for example, more
than 3.1 million students were suspended and 87,000 students expelled.
228 Eric Blumenson & Eva S. Nilson, One Strike and You're Out? Constitutional Constraints on
Zero Tolerance in Public Education, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 65 (2002) (quoting John J. Dilulio Jr., Rule of
Law: Why Violent Crime Rates Have Dropped, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 1995, at A 19).
21 John J. Dilulio, The Coming of the Super-Predators, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, Nov. 27, 1995,
at 23, available at http://www.mcsm.org/predator.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2005).
230 20 U.S.C. § 8921 (b)(1) (repealed 2002).
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While twenty-six states require that school districts provide alternative
education for expelled students, in eighteen states such alternative
education is not mandatory. 238 The number of suspensions and
expulsions resonates well with the incapacitation rationale of the policies,
aimed at providing "a second line of defense" if deterrence fails. 39 In
most cases, schools use harsh punishments even for minor infractions of a
non-violent nature such as smoking tobacco and skipping classes. Other
cases include minor offenses such as "possession of such 'weapons' as
key chains, staplers, and geometry compasses; and such 'drugs' as lemon
drops, asthma inhalers, Midol and Advil. ''240 To effectively implement
the zero tolerance policies, schools have increasingly made use of
investigative techniques, including mandatory random drug testing,
random locker searches, video surveillance, and making "records
identifying potential troublemakers. 241  Such techniques were in part
made possible by a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that weakened
242the Fourth Amendment rights of students. The use of these techniques,
combined with mandatory reporting of certain delinquents to law
enforcement officials, has dramatically increased criminal prosecutions of
students.243
The zero tolerance policies received strong criticism. Some
scholars have questioned the policies' necessity and proportionality.
They argued that media coverage of high-profile incidents has led people
to believe that there is a general school violence crisis when, in fact,
"ninety percent of our schools are free from serious crime'244 and "school
deaths are rare occurrences." 245 Between 1997 and 1998, 2752 children
were murdered in the U.S., but "just over one percent were school-
associated" incidents.246
Others have questioned the effectiveness of the schools' zero
tolerance policies. They maintain that the zero tolerance policies in
247schools have not been able to control school violence. During the
1990s, while schools harshly punished minor offenses, "the number of
students threatened or injured with a weapon remained constant." 248
Scholars also argued that there is little or no evidence that harsh zero
23 Id. at 71.
239 Id. at 81.
240 Id. at 72.
241 Blumenson & Nilson, supra note 228, at 73.
242 For an overview of such cases, see id. at 72-73.
243 Id. at 74.
244 Zweifler & De Beers, supra note 230, at 193.
245 Id.
246 Id.; Brady, supra note 226, at 165-66.
247 Blumenson & Nilson, supra note 228, at 76.
248 id.
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tolerance sanctions had a positive effect on decreasing school violence.249
According to some of them, strict zero tolerance schools may actually be
250less safe than schools with more lenient policies.
Finally, scholars questioned the constitutionality of the zero
tolerance policies. First, the Zero Tolerance school policies may violate
251
substantive due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.
For example, the mandatory punishment guidelines may preclude the
students' rights to be heard before being expelled.252 Furthermore, the
mandatory punishment guidelines make schools unwilling to allow
exceptions and to use discretion based on a full set of facts. 253 This
results in unreasonably harsh punishments for transgressions that should
have otherwise been excepted from punishment. According to a study,
"often the administrators fail to investigate the incident, and expel the
child based upon accusations and dubious evidence. This mindset allows
,,254for any kind of allegation to be considered for punishment. Students
challenging school expulsion or suspension decisions based on
substantive due process requirements have often failed because courts
have interpreted substantive due process violations narrowly, allowing
schools considerable discretion on how to punish such violations.
2 55
F. The American War on Terrorism Demonstrates that, in Times of
Crisis, Legal Systems Not Civil Liberties Evolve to Increase the
Effectiveness of Law Enforcement
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks created an unprecedented
shock both nationally and internationally. The incident led to a crisis;
terrorism had demolished the sense of safety Americans had previously
enjoyed at home. People demanded the leadership to aggressively deal
with the crisis, to apprehend and punish those responsible for the
atrocities, and to institute measures of prevention of future attacks. This
led to two major international military interventions in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Back at home, post-September 11 security concerns produced
policy responses designed to foster homeland security. As in the earlier
crises of the Prohibition, the Red Scare, the War on Drugs, and School
Violence, the legal system played a central role in the domestic "War on
Terror." This war again used a "prohibition model" strategy of
criminalizing a minority of "terrorists" to make a majority of the "law
249 id.
250 id.
211 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
252 Zweifler & De Beers, supra note 233, at 207.
253 Id. at 208.
254 Id.
255 Brady, supra note 226, at 177.
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abiding citizens" feel safe. As before, the sense of crisis produced an
urgent need for an effective government and efficient legal system, both
of which were at tension with the procedural formal-rational aspects of
the law. In order to protect the majority, the rights of the minorities
suspected of connections to terrorism suspects were curtailed.
As in the previous crises, the government's first reaction was to
enact stricter legislation. The first terrorism-relatedpieces of legislation,
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act25 ("AEDPA") and the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,257
followed the bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995. It
is noteworthy that, while both convicted Oklahoma bombers were "white,
native-born U.S. citizens,, 258 the two new laws focused on "non-citizen
offenders. 2 59 The AEDPA, for example, "includes provisions that deny
entry visas to members and representatives of designated foreign terrorist
organizations, prohibit foreign terrorist fundraising, reform habeas corpus,
and expedite asylum procedures." 260 The new legislation thus
"juxtaposed non-citizen terrorists and criminals on the one hand with law-
abiding citizens on the other., 2 6 1 The momentum created by the public
outcry after the Oklahoma city bombing enabled conservative legislators
to enact strict legislation that severely limited certain civil rights.262
After September 11, the Bush Administration called for new and
tougher counter-terrorism legislations. In a hearing before the Judiciary
Committee of the Congress, Attorney General John Ashcroft said:
First, our laws fail to make defeating terrorism a national
priority. Indeed, we have tougher laws against organized
crime and drug trafficking than against terrorism. Second,
technology has dramatically outpaced our statutes. Law
enforcement tools created decades ago were crafted for
rotary telephones-not email, the internet, mobile
communications and voice mail. Every day that passes with
outdated statutes and old rules of engagement is a day that
terrorists have a competitive advantage. Until Congress
makes these changes, we are fighting an unnecessarily uphill
256 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.
and 28 U.S.C. (1996)).
257 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.
(1996)).
258 Nora V. Demleitner, Immigration Threats and Rewards: Effective Law Enforcement Tools in
the "War" on Terrorism?, 51 EMORY L.J. 1059, 1061-62 (2002).
259 Id.; Alfredo Simon, The World Trade Center and "The Republic for Which It [Stood]," 55
RUTGERS L. REV. 1305, 1306-07 (2003).
260 Simon, supra note 259, at 1306.
261 Demleitner, supra note 258, at 1062.
262 See Simon, supra note 259, at 1320.
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battle. Members of the Committee, I regret to inform you
that we are today sending our troops into the modem field of
battle with antique weapons.263
In response, Congress enacted the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 ("USA Patriot Act"). 264 The new Act's
main goal was to "allocate to law enforcement and financial regulators
more realistic weapons and user-friendly laws to fight terrorists and
terrorist funding." The methods used to achieve this goal were
threefold. First, the Act enhanced domestic law enforcement efforts by
providing more lenient standards on "computer privacy, electronic
surveillance, warrants to trap and trace, no-knock searches, and
extraterritorial search warrants." Second, the Act attempted to keep
terrorists out of the country with stricter rules on immigration and border-
266crossing. 6 Third, the Act attacked terrorists by targeting their financial
assets with new regulations on banking and monetary transfers.267
September 11 changed the domestic law enforcement practice as
well-fighting terror became a top priority. Domestic anti-terrorism law
enforcement following the September 11 attack clearly focused on
foreign nationals from Muslim countries. 268 During the days following
the attack, U.S. security personnel placed more than 1200 persons, mostly
of Arabic or South Asian origin, in "preventive detention., 269 Many have
been deported to their home countries, while a number of them were
detained for a longer period.27 ° In some cases preventive detention took
place under total secrecy with "no visitors, no family, no press., 271 The
USA Patriot Act provided a legal basis for such preventive detention,
especially in cases where deportation was impossible. 272 It also
authorized registration requirements and special security measures for73
foreign students as enforcement measures. In 2002 and 2003, U.S.
authorities carried out registration drives during which more than two
thousand foreign nationals from Muslim countries were arrested when
263 Simon, supra note 259, at 1316-17, n. 59 (quoting Homeland Defense Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 8 (2001) (statement of John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney Gen.)).
264 Pub. L. No. 107-56 (2001).
265 Fletcher N. Baldwin Jr., The Rule of Law, Terrorism and Countermeasures Including the USA
Patriot Act of 2001, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 43, 52 (2003).
266 id.
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268 Braml, Rule of Law or Dictates by Fear: A German Perspective on American Civil Liberties
in the War against Terrorism, 27 FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAtRS 125-29 (2003).
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they failed to register with the authorities.274 After these mass arrests,
several organizations initiated class action suits against the relevant
authorities.275
As in the earlier crises, September 11-inspired policies posed
challenges to civil rights and subordinated the rule of law and due
process. 276 As Attorney General Ashcroft stated before the Senate
Judiciary Committee in December 2001:
We are at war with an enemy who abuses individual rights
as it abuses jet airliners: as weapons with which to kill
Americans. We have responded by redefining the mission of
the Department of Justice. Defending our nation and its
citizens against terrorist attacks is now our first and
overriding priority.
7
Ashcroft even "put criticism of the restriction of civil liberties in
the same league as treason. ' ' 278 When civil liberties advocates challenged
the country's new "arrest policy ' 279 in court, the judges ruled in their
favor calling for a restoration of the rule of law restraints to government
action and labeling preventive detention practices as "odious to
democratic society., 280 Perhaps as a sign of the severity of the current
crisis, the Bush administration condemned the decision and emphasized
their instrumental approach to the law and even the Constitution:
281
We are standing firm in our commitment to protect
American lives .... We're removing suspected terrorists
who violate the law from our streets to prevent further
terrorist attack. [sic] We believe we have al Qaeda
membership in custody, and we will use every constitutional
tool to keep suspected terrorists locked up.
282
Now that several years have passed and the need for state action
against terrorism is less urgent, there may be more room for the voices of
274 Braml, supra note 268, at 128-29.
275 Id. at 129.
276 Id. at 125.
277 Id. (quoting Testimony of Attorney-General John Ashcroft, Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, Dec. 6, 2001).
278 Id. at 131 (analyzing Testimony of Attorney-General John Ashcroft, Senate Committee on the
Judiciary).
279 Id. at 126.
280 id.
281 ld.
282 Attorney-General Ashcroft, Press Statement, Attorney General Ashcroft Provides Total
Number of Criminal Charges and INS Detainees, Nov. 27, 2001, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
archive/ag/speeches/2001/agcrisisremarksl I27.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
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those advocating civil liberties and the rights of the minorities. Perhaps,
as in the Red Scare example, the present period of crisis will end,
reestablishing the role of courts in finding balance between the country's
need for safety and the individuals' need for their rights.
G. In Times of Crisis Perceptions of Justice Change and the Law
Becomes a Tool for the Government in Both China and the U.S.
The analyses of the politico-legal campaigns of China and the legal
reactions to crises in the U.S. reveal a number of similarities. In both
instances, the leadership used law as a tool of achieving its goal. The
leadership procured tough legislation and focused on better enforcement.
Further, the law's enhanced effectiveness came at the cost of restrictions
on procedural fairness.
Crises create windows of opportunity for change. Those who get
to define the crisis and its causes gain the power to initiate change. If
they choose to do so by using the law as a tool, ordinary procedural
formal-rational restrictions such as due process requirements will be
minimized in a crisis situation. Crises can therefore become
opportunities to change the law. A sense of crisis can overshadow the
law. That is, in a crisis situation, the "effective law" that protects the
rights of the majority law-abiders becomes more important than formal-
rational, procedural rule of law requirements that protect procedural
rights of minority offenders. The analysis of the law in times of crisis in
the U.S. is a reminder of the politico-legal reality of the West, sometimes
too easily forgotten when studying a legal system such as China. It
shows that there are multiple dimensions to the law. First, there is the
rule of law dimension that emphasizes the formal-rational legal limits on
government actions.283 There is, however, also the need for effective
government action through the use of law-what I have called the goal-
oriented dimension or the effective law.
284
While China has traditionally emphasized the instrumental role of
law since the reform period, more recently the formal-rational rule of law
idea has gradually gained importance.285 In the U.S., it appears that, in
times of crises, there have been clear shifts towards an effective legal
system that is similar to China's perception of the role of law-"rule by
283 LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38-44 (1976).
284 Over the last decade the term "effective law" is increasingly used in American law journals to
describe law's reaction to crisis. See Lisa Patrice Taylor, Illinois v. Perkins: Balancing the Need for
Effective Law Enforcement Against A Suspect's Constitutional Rights, 1991 WIS. L.REv. 989, 1025-29
(1991); Roundtable, Law and Disorder: Is Effective Law Enforcement Inconsistent with Good Police-
Community Relations?, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 363, 363-64 (2000).
285 PEERENBOOM, LONG MARCH, supra note 106, at 558.
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fear" as one scholar called it. 286 Like the international human rights
organizations' criticism of China's human rights violations and harsh
punishments in the Strike Hard campaigns or the Falun Gong crack-
287downs, legal scholarship in the U.S. has been critical about the
restrictions on civil liberties imposed by tough legislation and
enforcement in national crises.
It is important to note that China and the West, the U.S. in
particular, share common dilemmas. Even though the political contexts
are completely different, one may draw lessons from the other's
experience in balancing the rule of law with effective law. While law and
politics obviously go hand-in-hand in China, a sense of crisis can create a
similar match in a rule-of-law-based country like the U.S. Recognition of
this shared dilemma will lead to a real dialogue, instead of an unrealistic
exchange of idealistic representations of how well the law functions in
one country and how poorly it does in the other. Another lesson is that
justice is often realized in reaction to the crises. A crisis may well be a
litmus test for testing the boundaries of law. Legal justice expands to its
maximum after such a crisis. In the U.S., the Red Scare crisis in the
1950s and 1960s, for example, produced important doctrines on the First
Amendment's freedom of expression. In China, unfortunately, the
political-legal set-up that lacks separation of powers largely precludes
such justice-promoting legal developments.
VI. CONCLUSION
In China corruption has a close relationship with the law. This is
not only because corruption has an adverse impact on the country's
reemerging legal system, which many would expect, but also because law
is employed as a tool to fight corruption. The struggle against corruption
has become a struggle of life and death for the CCP.
Because a large part of this struggle takes place in the legal arena,
the legal system as a whole has become more important. This may enable
the law to function more effectively in China.288 In other words, because
of the law's importance in the struggle against corruption, those in power
will try to make the legal system more effective. They have so far
achieved this goal by intervening into the everyday operation of the legal
system, making it focus on certain kinds of corruption violations, and
ensuring publicity through the press. The legal system has reacted by
providing harsh punishments for major cases and high-level officials. A
286 Braml, supra note 268, at 129.
287 AMNESTY INT'L, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND
THE CRACKDOWN ON DISSENT CONTINUE, supra note 149; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 151.
288 Yufan Hao, From Rule of Man to Rule of Law: An Unintended Consequence of Corruption in
China in the 1990s, 8 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 405, 405-06 (1999).
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question, however, remains whether such an effective legal system is a
good one. A legal system that is effective because it follows the
directions of politics, which will change over time, may not be a just and
fair system leading to legal stability. As indicated above, China is not
alone in its political pressure on the legal system. Many legal systems
seem to share this characteristic to some extent. However, while this
phenomenon is obvious in China and often criticized, it remains less
recognized outside China.
Another question is whether the politico-legal campaigns have
been successful in fighting corruption. In this regard, it is important to
note that while this Article analyzed only the anti-corruption campaigns,
Chinese government also made other efforts in its fight against the
problem. A recent example is a structural reform to enhance internal
accountability within the state party. In the beginning of 2002, the
Seventh Meeting of the CCP Central Commission for Disciplinary
Inspection decided to conduct an experiment in three central level
ministries. CCP Disciplinary Inspection committees in the central
ministries are normally governed by both the ministry in which they
reside and the CCP Central Commission on Disciplinary Inspection. The
experiment was to give CCP Central Disciplinary Commission exclusive
control over the ministerial disciplinary inspection organs. It thus
provided the Commission with independent watchdogs within the
ministries. As a result, the Commission, instead of the ministries, held
the right to directly appoint the leaders of the internal inspection organs.
In March 2003, this experiment reached its next stage. Later that year,
discussions were conducted on whether and how to apply this system at
the provincial level. In order to do so, a change in the party constitution
was required, because it originally stipulated that provincial-level party
disciplinary inspection bodies could be governed only at the provincial
level.289 Another new measure that began in 2003 was the deployment of
special central-level envoys who evaluate and monitor provincial leaders'
performance over a period of four years. This new strategy is rooted in
the Chinese imperial tradition of checking on provincial officials that
resided far away from the capital .290
Because anti-corruption campaigns are not the only efforts made to
resolve the corruption problem, it is difficult to measure the exact impact
they had. Another problem is that the CPI is the only reliable data on
corruption and even it presents only perceived, instead of actual,
289 Nan Li, Zhongyang Fanfu Pin Chuzhao Zhongji Wei "Tongyi Guanli" Fanfubai Zhanxian?
[Will the Central Anti-Corruption Again Enroll the Central Disciplinary Commission's "Unified
Management" at the Anti-Corruption Battlefront?], PEOPLE's DAILY, Sept. 24, 2003.
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corruption. Despite these limitations, however, there are analyses that
can shed some light on this issue. In a 2000 survey, twelve percent of
those questioned were highly confident in the government's anti-
corruption campaigns, while forty percent thought it was ineffective or a
waste of time. As one editorial opined at the time, "one reason [for these
results] is the widespread perception that the government's anti-
corruption campaign is aimed solely at lower-level officials and that those
at high levels, or with good connections to the central government, are
largely immune.",291 Bao Tong, former secretary to the ex-party chief
Zhao Ziyang, has remained outspoken to this ongoing issue of the fight
against corruption. When Jiang Zemin unfolded yet another round of
crackdown on corruption-related crimes, Bao said that "Mr. Jiang only
paid lip service to fighting graft and democracy was the most effective
tool to stamp it out.
' 292
It appears that the CCP leadership has followed a risky approach of
openly combating corruption of higher-level officials. Chinese leaders
recognized, in accordance with the results of the above-cited survey, that
in order to convince the people of their earnest efforts, they would have to
focus on higher level officials. They accomplished this by changing their
strategy and implementing high-profile corruption prosecutions through
politico-legal campaigns. There is an inherent danger, however, to this
approach. The media attention the big cases draw will maintain the
perception of corruption at a high level. As long as high-profile officials
get executed, people will feel as if the government is actively eradicating
corruption, but at the same time will experience the pervasive effects of
corruption at lower levels. This latter sense may be reinforced because
the strategy of prosecuting high-level officials has been interpreted to
indicate that lower-level officials will be left undisturbed.
293 Rupert Wingfield-Hayes, China to Execute Corrupt Boss, BBC NEWS, Dec. 21, 2000,
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2001, available at http://special.scmp.com/commpartyat80/news/ZZZZVSCXJOC.html (last visited
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